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INTRODUCrION

It is emphatically the province and duty of the President to say what
the law is, including the law embodied in the Federal Constitution. In the
mid-1980s, a claim of this sort would have been received by the legal
intelligentsia with some combination of bemusement and outrage. One
would have heard, loudly and often, that it is the special province of the
federal courts to declare the meaning of the Constitution, -Lnd that any
attempt to question the judiciary's supreme interpretative role, especially
in favor of an interpretative role for the President, was an attack on the
rule of law itself
Indeed, that is precisely what was heard from much of the American
legal community in 1986 when then-Attorney General Edwin Meese III
suggested in a speech that there might be a relevant difference between
the Constitution and the courts' interpretations of the Constitution.!
Attorney General Meese's claim that the executive department (and
Congress) had the power and duty to consider the constitutionality of their
actions independently of the views of the courts generated an overwhelmingly, and often ferociously, negative response among commentators.2
Moreover, when the executive department put the principle of
interpretative independence into practice in the 1980s and actually
construed the Constitution (and federal statutes) in a fashion that did not
conform to prior judicial interpretations, the federal courts joined the
chorus of disapproval with a vengeance.!

1. See Edwin Meese H, The Law of the Constitution, 61 TuL L Rev. 979 (1987)
(reprinting Attorney General Meese's speech).
2. See, eg., Burt Neuborne, The Binding Quality of Supreme Court Precedent, 61 Tul. L
Rev. 991 (1987); Michael Kinsley, Meese's Stink Bomb, Wash. Post, Oct. 29, 1986, at A19;
Anthony Lewis, Law or Power?, N.Y. Times, Oct. 27, 1986, at A23; Mr. Meese's Contempt of
Court, N.Y. Times, Oct. 26, 1986, at 4-22; Why Give That Speech?, Wash. Post, Oct. 29, 1986,
at A18. To be sure, the immediate response vas not wholly negative. See, ag., Sanford
Levinson, Could Meese Be Right This Time?, 61 Tul. L. Rev. 1071 (1987).
3. A panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that it was bad faith, for
purposes of awarding attorney's fees, for the Executive to act upon a constitutional view
different from that of the courts. See Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Lehman, 842 F.2d 1102, 1119-26 (9th
Cir. 1988), rev'd and remanded,893 F.2d 205 (1989) (en banc). The federal courts' reaction to
the longstanding policy of some federal agencies to refuse in some circumstances to follow
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More recently, however, the tide has turned, and the 1990s have given
rise to a growing and constructive dialogue on the role of the President
(and Congress) in the interpretation of the Federal Constitution.4 It is
now widely recognized, at least among those scholars who take such
questions seriously, that the debate over institutional interpretative
authority has a long and distinguished pedigree that transcends the

circuit court precedent concerning the meaning of statutes bordered on the hysterical. For a
sample, see Joshua I. Schwartz, Nonacquiescence, Crull v. Benson, and Administrative
Adjudication, 77 Ceo. L.J. 1815, 1821 n.15, 1823 n.23 (1989). And one can only imagine the
response that a challenge to judicial supremacy would receive from the Supreme Court
Justices who recently wrote or signed onto the following statement:
Like the character of an individual, the legitimacy of the Court must be earned over
time. So, indeed, must be the character of a Nation of people who aspire to live
according to the rule of law. Their belief in themselves as such a people is not
readily separable from their understanding of the Court invested with the authority
to decide their constitutional cases and speak before all others for their constitutional ideals.
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 US. 833, 869 (1992). S Daniel 0.
Conkle, Nonoriginaist Constitutional Rights and the Problem of Judicial Finality, 13 Hastings
Const. L.Q. 9, 12 (1985) ("[T]he Court does not ... expect executive or legislative officials to
reevaluate for themselves the validity of the Court's constitutional rulings.").
4. Se e.g., Michael J. Perry, What Is the Constitution?, in Constitutionalism:
Philosophical Foundations (Lawrence A. Alexander ed., forthcoming 1997); Gary Apfel,
Whose Constitution Is It Anyway? The Authority of the Judiciary's Interpretation of the
Constitution, 46 Rutgers L Rev. 771 (1994); Steven G. Calabresi, Thayer's Clear Mistake, 88
Nw. U. L Rev. 269, 272-76 (1993); Frank H. Easterbrook, Presidential Review, 40 Case W. Res.
I Rev. 905 (1990); Christopher L. Eisgruber, The Most Competent Branches: A Response to
Professor Paulsen, 83 Geo. LJ. 347 (1994); David E. Engdahl, John Marshall's "Jeffersonian"
Concept of Judicial Review, 42 Duke UJ. 279 (1992) [hereinafter Engdahl, John Marshall's
"Jeffersonian" Concept]; David E. Engdahl, What's in a Name: The Constitutionality of
Multiple "Supreme" Courts, 66 Ind. L Rev. 457 (1991); Sanford Levinson, Constitutional
Protestantism in Theory and Practice: Two Questions for Michael Stokes Paulsen and One for
His Critics, 83 Geo. UJ. 373 (1994); Christopher N. May, Presidential Defiance of
"Unconstitutional" Laws: Reviving the Royal Prerogative, 21 Hastings Const. LQ. 865 (1994);
John 0. McGinnis, Models of the Opinion Function of the Attorney General: A Normative,
Descriptive, and Historical Prolegomenon, 15 Cardozo L. Rev. 375 (1993); Thomas W. Merrill,
Judicial Opinions as Binding Law and as Explanations for Judgments, 15 Cardozo L Rev. 43
(1993); Geoffrey P. Miller, The President's Power of Interpretation: Implications of a Unified
Theory of Constitutional Law, 56 Law & Contemp. Probs. 35 (1993); Robert F. Nagel, NameCalling and the Clear Error Rule, 88 Nw. U. L Rev. 193 (1993); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The
Meryman Power and the Dilemma of Autonomous Executive Branch Interpretation, 15
Cardozo L. Rev. 81 (1993) [hereinafter Paulsen, The Menyman Power]; Michael Stokes
Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 Geo. LJ.
217 (1994) [hereinafter Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch]; Michael Stokes Paulsen,
Protestantism and Comparative Competence: A Reply to Professors Levinson and Eisgruber,
83 Geo. UJ. 385 (1994) [hereinafter Paulsen, Reply]; Michel Rosenfeld, Executive Autonomy,
Judicial Authority and the Rule of Law Reflections on Constitutional Interpretation and the
Separation of Powers, 15 Cardozo L Rev. 137 (1993); David A. Strauss, Presidential
Interpretation of the Constitution, 15 Cardozo L Rev. 113 (1993); see also Michael B.
Rappaport, The President's Veto and the Constitution, 87 Nw. U. L Rev. 735, 738 (1993)
(describing some consequences of a presidential power to interpret the Constitution without
taking a position on the power's scope).
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partisan politics of the moment.! Moreover, the structural, historical, and
normative case for "departmentalist' constitutional interpretation-for the
federal legislative, executive, and judicial departments6 each having an
obligation, in the exercise of its granted powers, to interpret and apply the
Constitution-is now familiar. Some version of departmentalism may even
reflect the consensus view among serious scholars of the Constitution.!
Our goal is to add a textual element to the structural, historical, and
normative arguments for and against departmentalism that have been so
well developed in prior scholarship.8 We seek to identify the textual
sources of the President's power to interpret the Constitution and of any
limits that the Constitution, either directly or by implication, imposes on
that power in different contexts.
In Part I, we lay the groundwork for our analysis by examining the
constitutional sources of, and limits on, the interpretative power of the
federal courts. We show that the general grant of "[tihe judicial Power" in
Article III includes a power (and duty) to interpret and apply the
Constitution in the course of resolving disputes. Moreover, we find that the
best understanding of the constitutional scheme establishes that the courts
should, at least generally, interpret the Constitution independently of
Congress and the President; courts should act without giving legallybinding deference to the prior constitutional decisions of the political
departments.
In Part II, we establish that the arguments for independent judicial
review also establish a prima facie case for a power of independent
presidential review, derived from the constitutional grant to the President
of "[t]he executive Power." We then show that, in all but one context, no
textual provisions of the Constitution defeat this prima fade case for
independent presidential review, and that the President accordingly is not
bound by, or legally required to give deference to, the constitutional
determinations of Congress or the courts. Of course, the determinations of
Congress or the courts may, in many circumstances, be good indicators of
the right answer to constitutional questions and may thus be entitled to

5. See The Federalist Society, Who Speaks for the Constitution?: The Debate over
Interpretive Authority (1992) (collecting many of the most important historical sources).
6. We follow the dominant practice of the founding generation by referring to the
federal legislature, executive, and judiciary as "departments," reserving the term "branches"
for the different houses of a multicameral legislature. See generally Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin
H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, PluralJudiciary, 105 Harv. L Rev.
1153, 1156 n.6 (1992).
7. It is less certain, however, that departmentalism prevails across a wider sample of the
legal academy. See Miller, supra note 4, at 39 ("Judicial supremacists probably represent the
majority view among U.S. legal academics.").
8. Professor Michael Stokes Paulsen in particular deserves credit for elevating the debate
to new levels. See, ag., Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch, supra note 4; Paulsen, The
Mertywan Power, supra note 4.
9. This Article largely postpones to another day the related issue of whether courts must
or may give deference to the prior constitutional decisions of other courts.
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deference by a President who is conscientiously seeking the right answers.
But such deference stems only from a contingentjudgment, perhaps based
on an assessment both of the interpretation and of the interpreter, that a
particular Congress or court in a particular circumstance is likely to have
correctly interpreted the Constitution. We refer to such deference that is a
by-product of an independent search for the right answer as "epistemological
deference," as opposed to "legal deference" that results from the
constitutionally-prescribed authoritative status of the prior interpreter.
The one context in which the President must give legal rather than
epistemological deference to the views of other actors concerns the
enforcement of specific court judgments-the raw determinations of
liability or nonliability (as opposed to the explanations for those
determinations embodied in judicial opinions) rendered in specific cases.
We conclude, as have almost all modern legal commentators who have
addressed the subject, that the President is generally obliged to obey and
enforce federal court judgments. We further conclude, however, albeit
without a great deal of confidence, that there are limited circumstances in
which such judgments are not necessarily legally binding on the President.
Specifically, the President has the power to refuse to enforce federal court
judgments that rest on constitutional errors, or whose execution would
entail constitutional violations, but only when the President is vey certain of
the constitutional error or constitutional violation. It is not enough that
the President thinks, on balance, that the judgment is erroneous. In other
words, the President owes a substantial, although not unlimited, measure
of legal deference to the constitutional determinations of federal courts
that are expressed in specific, concrete judgments.
In Part III, we comment briefly on the role of departmentalism in the
Constitution's scheme of separated and divided powers. Although conflict
between the institutions is inevitable in departmentalism, we conclude that
such conflict is no greater than that found elsewhere under the system of
separation of powers.
We emphasize that our methodology in this Article is explicitly
originalist and our task is strictly descriptive rather than prescriptive: we
are trying to determine the meaning that the relevant provisions of the
Constitution would have had to a fully-informed general public in 1789.0
We leave for another day the questions whether there are any sound nonoriginalist arguments for or against any form of presidential (or judicial)
review and whether an ideal constitution would prescribe a different
allocation of interpretative authority.

10. For the best available description of originalist methodology, see Steven G. Calabresi
& Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's Power to Execute the Laws, 104 Yale LJ. 541, 550-59
(1994).
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EDERAL COURTS' POWER OF LAW INTERPRETATION

The national government is a government of limited and enumerated
powers that must find affirmative constitutional authorization for any
action that it takes." Similarly, each constituent institution of the national
government is an institution of limited and enumerated ]powers. The
federal legislative, executive, and judicial departments, and all officers
thereof, must find express or implied constitutional authorization for all of
their actions, and the scope of those authorizations determines the scope
of the relevant powers.
Nothing in the Constitution expressly says that the President has the
power to interpret and apply the Constitution. By the same token,
however, nothing in the Constitution expressly says that the federal courts,
including the Supreme Court, have the power to interpret and apply the
Constitution. 2 It is therefore instructive to examine briefly the
constitutional sources of, and limits on, the law-interpreting powers of the
federal courts as a prelude to exploring the constitutional sources of, and
limits on, the President's power to interpret the laws.'

A. The FederalCourts' Power to Interpret the Laws: Sources
The first section of Article III of the Constitution provides that "[tihe
judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court,
and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain
and establish." 14 Apart from the Appointments Clause, which empowers
"the Courts of Law" to appoint inferior federal officers when Congress so
permits,'5 this Vesting Clause is the only provision of the Constitution that
grants any power to the federal courts. 6 Other provisions of Article III

11. For some representative statements to this effect from prominent founding-era
Federalists, see Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The "Proper" Scope of Federal Power:. A
Jurisdictional Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43 Duke UJ. 267, 315-18 (1993).
12. See Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch, supra note 4, at 241.
13. Although we are ultimately concerned with the ability of various actors to act upon
their legal interpretations, for ease of exposition we will henceforth speak only of the power
to "interpret" the laws rather than of the power to "interpret and apply" the laws.
14. U.S. Const. art. III, § 1.
15. Id. art. 1I,§ 2, d. 2 ("[T]he Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such
Inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the
Heads of Departments."). We do not address here the scope of this appointment power, and
in particular we do not address whether this clause empowers federal courts, when directed by
Congress, to appoint nonjudidal inferior officers. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 675-76
(1988) (suggesting that courts might not be able to appoint nonjudicial officers "if there
[were] some 'incongruity' between the functions normally performed by the courts and the
performance of their duty to appoint") (quoting Exparte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 398 (1879)).
16. The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court is empowered, and obliged, to preside over
presidential Impeachment trials in the Senate, U.S. Const. art. I, § 3, cI. 6, but this is a power
personally vested in the Chief Justice rather than in the federal courts. One might also say
that federal judges are empowered to stay in office during good behavior and to receive
salaries that are not to be diminished during their time in office, see id. art. HI,§ 1 ("[Tjhe
Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good
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specify limitations on the courts' powers by identifying the classes of
disputes to which the judicial power extends17 and by directing the use of
certain procedures in criminal trials, 8 but the Article III Vesting Clause is,
in all matters except the appointment of inferior officers, the sole
constitutional source of the federal judiciary's power to acL' 9
The judicial power is the power to decide cases or controversies in
accordance with governing law. As James Wilson put it, "[tihe judicial
authority consists in applying, according to the principles of right and
justice, the constitution and laws to facts and transactions in cases, in
which the manner or principles of this application are disputed by the
parties interested in them."20 The power to interpret the laws is an
incident to this case- or controversy-deciding function; courts must
interpret because they must decide. 2'Accordingly, federal courts obviously

Behavior, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall
not be diminished during their Continuance in Office."), but it seems odd to describe a
tenure provision as a grant of power.
Professor Michael Froomkin has recently sought to argue that the federal courts are
empowered to act by § 2 of Article III, which provides that "[t]hejudicial Power shall extend
to" nine specified categories of disputes. SeeA. Michael Froomkin, The Imperial Presidency's
New Vestments, 88 Nw. U. L Rev. 1346 (1994). This claim is untenable. Section 2 describes
the class of disputes to which a pre-existing judicial power extends; both textually and
structurally, it is a limitation on the previously-grantedjudicial power, not a grant of power in
itself. Professor Froomkin's argument is decisively rebutted in Steven G. Calabresi, The
Vesting Clauses as Power Grants, 88 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1377 (1994).
17. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cls. 1-2.
18. See id. art III, § 2, cl. 3 (specifying the venue for criminal trials); id. art. III, § 3
(defining treason and providing that no conviction for treason is permissible "unless on the
Testimony of two Witnesses to the overt Act, or on Confession in open Court"). The Bill of
Rights adds additional procedural limitations on the conduct of trials, both civil and criminal,
see id. amend. V (requiring indictment by grand jury in criminal cases, prohibiting double
jeopardy, requiring due process of law for deprivations of life, liberty, and property, and
requiring compensation for public takings of property); id. amend. VI (guaranteeing in
criminal trials rights to jury trial, confrontation, compulsory process, and counsel); id. amend.
VII (preserving the right to jury trial in most civil cases), and it limits the power of federal
judges to issue warrants, see id. amend. IV ("no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized"), and to set bail, levy fines, or impose punishment. See id.
amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and
unusual punishments inflicted.").
19. See Calabresi, supra note 16, at 1379-82; Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 10, at 571.
The so-called Necessary and Proper Clause, which was known to the founding generation as
the Sweeping Clause, see Lawson & Granger, supra note 11, at 270, cannot be used to
empower the federal judiciary to act. The clause provides that Congress shall have power "[to
make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing
Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United
States, or in any Department or Officer thereof." US. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. This clause by
its terms only authorizes Congress to pass laws that implement or carry into effect powers that
are vested by some other provision(s) of the Constitution. If the Constitution did not
elsewhere vest powers in the federal judiciary, Congress could not create those powers
through the Sweeping Clause.
20. James Wilson, 1 The Works of James Wilson 296 (Robert G. McCloskey ed., 1967).
21. As John Marshall put it, "[tihose who apply the rule to particular cases, must of
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have the power to interpret the laws, but that power emanates from a
specific constitutional source (the Article III Vesting Clause) in a specific
set of contexts (resolution of cases or controversies within the courts'
jurisdictions).
This constitutional power of law interpretation includes the power to
interpret and apply the Constitution. The Constitution declares itself to be
a source of positive law for state courts,2 and Chief Justice John Marshall
was surely correct to view it as a source of positive law for the federal
courts as well." The interesting question concerning judicial review is not
whether the federal courts have the power to interpret the Constitution
(they do), or when that power can be exercised (as an incident to the
exercise of the case- or controversy-deciding power), but how the
Constitution permits or requires that power to be exercised. 24 Should
courts exercise their own judgment about the meaning of the Constitution,
or should they defer to the constitutional views of legislative or executive
actors?2s After all, to say that federal courts have the power, or duty, to
interpret the Constitution is not necessarily to say that they have the power
to interpret it independently of the views of other governmental actors.
B. The Federal Courts' Power to Interpret the Laws: Limits
When government officials other than federal judges act-for
example, by enacting legislation-their actions generally constitute an
implicit, and sometimes explicit, construction of the Constitution. It is
perfectly possible to say that federal courts have the power to interpret the
Constitution, but that such interpretation must be guided, or even
determinatively guided, by the interpretations of other actors. Indeed, not
only is such a view possible, some variant of this view was probably the
dominant understanding of the role of the courts in constitutional
adjudication until the last century-at least with regard to judicial review of
actions of the federal legislative and executive departments. James Bradley
Thayer, in his classic 1893 article on judicial review,26' described (with
approval) the federal courts' practice of not rejecting federal legislation as
unconstitutional, and thus not rejecting the legislative or executive

necessity expound and interpret that rule." Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177

(1803).
22. See U.S. Const. art. VI, d. 2 ("This Constitution ... shall be the supreme Law of the
Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or

Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.").
23. See Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177 (stating that the Constitution is "a superior

paramount law").
24. One must also be concerned about how the exercise of that power affects other
actors, but for the moment we are addressing only the sources of and limits on the
Interpretative power of the federal courts.
25. We put aside the question whether courts can or should defer to the views of other
courts.
26. James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional
Lav, 7 Harv. L Rev. 129 (1893).
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departments' interpretations of the Constitution, unless "those who have
the right to make laws have not merely made a mistake, but have made a
very clear one,--so dear that it is not open to rational question."2
Modem scholarship confirms that this was a frequently expressed position
during the founding era,28 and the position survives today in the
presumption of constitutionality that is supposed to accompany federal
legislative or executive action.? Thus, while almost no one has ever
maintained that federal courts are in all cases absolutely bound by the
constitutional views of the political departments," many people still hold
the view that the federal courts' power of constitutional interpretation is
constrainedby the actions of other departments. According to this position,
which we refer to as "Thayerian,"1 the courts' power of constitutional
interpretation is independent in the sense of allowing courts to exercise
their own judgment about the meaning of the Constitution, but it is not
independent in the sense of allowing courts freely to substitute their
judgments, de novo, for the constitutional judgments of the political
departments. Thayerian review is deferential review.
This Thayerian view of the courts' interpretative power is highly
controversial. Powerful arguments can be made that the federal courts'
judgments about the meaning of the Constitution can and must be
independent in the strong sense of being formally unconstrained by the
views of other actors! 2 Although the matter is not free from doubt, on
balance we regard the arguments for formal judicial interpretative
independence to be stronger than the arguments for a Thayerian
interpretative posture.
First, one can infer such interpretative independence from what
Professor Michael Stokes Paulsen terms the postulate of coordinacy.33 the
fact that all three departments of the national government are equally
created by the Constitution, are "coequal in title and rank as representatives of the People,"34 and all owe allegiance first and foremost to the

27. Id. at 144.
28. For an excellent survey of relevant materials, see Sylvia Snowiss, Judicial Review and
the Law of the Constitution 13.44 (1990).
29. See John F. Manning, Not Proved. Some Lingering Questions About Legislative
Succession to the Presidency, 48 Stan. L.Rev. 141, 141 n.5 (1995).
30. Of course, under the so-called political question doctrine, there are contexts in which
the courts must accept the constitutional judgments of the political departments as conclusive.
These contexts, however, are limited, and the doctrine is controversial. See Martin H. Redish,
The Federal Courts in the Political Order, 111-36 (1991) (questioning the legitimacy of much
of the contemporary political question doctrine).
31. For a thoughtful discussion of Thayerian review in the context of one aspect of the
judicial review process, see Michael J. Perry, The Constitution in the Courts: Law or Politics?,
86-95 (1994).
32. "Formally unconstrained" is used because even actors with complete interpretative
freedom can choose to follow other persuasive views.
33. Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch, supra note 4, at 228.
34. Id. at 229. This Article will not rehearse Professor Paulsen's overwhelming theoretical
and historical case for the postulate of coordinacy in the context of American
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Constitution that empowers them. A natural inference from this postulate

is that each department must follow its own judgment as to the meaning of
the Constitution. Such an inference, of course, is not inevitable; as
Professor Paulsen points out, institutions can be coordinate without being
equal in power."- Thus, it does not directly follow from the principle of
coordinacy that the courts must have the same quality and degree of lawinterpreting power as do the political departments. Nonetheless, the power
and duty to interpret the Constitution is not expressly granted to any
particular department, but is equally derived by inference for each
department. Coordinacy, in the context of this shared power of
interpretation, most plausibly entails equality and independence.
Second, one of the purposes of a system of divided government is to
ensure that government action generally takes place only when distinct
actors with distinct roles and functions all agree that the action is
permissible. With this understanding, interpretative independence by the
judiciary is a necessary component of a system of checks and balances.
Only when the Congress, the President, and the courts all agree on an
interpretation can the national government lawfully act on the basis of that
interpretation t 6-- unless, of course, the Constitution specifically commits
the decision in question to fewer than all of the departments. On this view,
interpretative independence is an integral part of the separation of powers.
Of course, this argument for judicial independence, as with the argument
from coordinacy, is not conclusive. It is not self-evident that the
constitutional scheme of separated powers requires that each department
agree to all actions; a system of checks and balances need not be perfectly
symmetrical in order to be effective. Nonetheless, a scheme of judicial
interpretative independence seems more consistent with principles of
divided government than does a scheme of Thayerian deference to the
legislature or the President.
Third, and related to the second point, one of the background
principles of Anglo-American law, dating back at least to Dr. Bonham's
Case, 7 is that a person should not be a judge in his own cause. In the
context of the American system of separated and enumerated powers, that
means that no department should be allowed ultimately to determine the
scope of its own powers. If one department's view of its constitutional
powers constrains the interpretative powers of other departments, the first
department effectively gets to act as the judge--or at least as the trial
judge, subject to only limited appellate review-in its own cause. Moreover,
the Constitution on a few occasions specifically and expressly makes certain
actors the judges of the scope of their powers. Five clauses in the

constitutionalism See id.
35.

Seeid.

36, See Calabresi, supra note 4, at 275; Easterbrook, supra note 4, at 927. But see Paulsen,
The Most Dangerous Branch, supra note 4, at 296 n.271 (suggesting that this view leads to

judicial supremacy).
37. 8 Coke's Rep. 107a, l8a (1610).
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Constitution grant power to certain actors while specifically giving those
actors discretion to determine the proper occasions for exercise of those
powers:3s the states, until 1808, were granted power to import "such
Persons [meaning slaves] as any of the States now existing shall think prper
to admit7;39 Congress is granted power to permit "such inferior Officers,
as they think prope?' to be appointed without Senate confirmation; 40 the
President is empowered to recommend to Congress "such Measures as he
shalljudge necessary and expedien"' 41 and, when the two houses of Congress
cannot agree on a time of adjournment, to adjourn Congress "to such
Time as he shall think prop"e'; 42 and Congress is given power to propose
amendments to the Constitution "whenever two-thirds of both Houses shall
deem it necessary .. . ."4 Each of these provisions expressly gives to the
entity to which power is granted discretion to determine the circumstances
under which those powers should be exercised. Accordingly, when the
Constitution wishes to make actors the judge of the extent of their own
powers, it does so expressly.4
Fourth, one can argue against Thayerian deference on the ground
that officials swear an oath to uphold the Constitution, not the views of the
Constitution articulated by other actors. Again, this argument is not
conclusive, as it presumes that the Constitution does not itself require
deference to the views of other actors, but at a minimum it places the
burden of proof on opponents of interpretative independence to show that
the Constitution affirmatively requires deference.
Fifth, the positive case for Thayerian, deferential review may not be as
strong as it seems at first glance. It is true that many, if not most,
descriptions of the power of judicial review during the founding era used
the language of Thayerian deference, but those statements are not decisive
for several reasons. First, individual expressions, especially post-enactment
expressions, cannot prevail over clear textual and structural inferences.
Second, people did not always practice what they preached. There were

38. These provisions are discussed in more detail in Lawson & Granger, supra note 11, at
277-78.
39. U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, d. 1 (emphasis added).
40. Id. art. II, § 2, c. 2 (emphasis added).
41. Id. art. II, § 3 (emphasis added).
42. Id. (emphasis added).
43. Id. art. V (emphasis added).
44. And, of course, these provisions only give the relevant actors discretion to determine
when those powers should be exercised. The Constitution does not expressly empower these
actors to define the content of their powers. Congress, for example, does not have discretion to
determine which officers of the United States are "inferior Officers," though it does have
discretion to determine which inferior officers shall be appointed without Senate confirmation.
45. See Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch, supra note 4, at 257-62 (describing how the
oath to uphold the Constitution supports "co-equal independent interpretive power for each
branch of government.").
46. See Strauss, supra note 4, at 121-22 (noting that the Oath Clause argument begs the
question because it fails
to answer what the Constitution requires).
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relatively few occasions for constitutional judicial review in the founding
era, but it is hard to describe all of the examples that did take place as
Thayerian 7 One must, of course, discount the views of judicial power
expressed in judicial opinions as self-interested expressions-as
determinations in the judges' own cause-but they suggest that the
consensus in favor of Thayerian review was not universal. Finally, and most
importantly, one must distinguish between legal arguments for deference
and pragmaticor epistemologicalarguments for deference. It is one thing to
say that, as a matter of sound practice, judges should give a great deal of
consideration to the constitutional views of Congress and the President-especially in a context in which the legislative and executive
departments are likely to produce right answers to constitutional questions.
Such deference is entirely consistent with a regime in which judges
independently search for right answers. It is quite another thing, however,
to say that judges are constitutionally bound to give deference to the
constitutional views of the political departments simply by virtue of the
political departments' legal status. This latter kind of deference is legal
rather than epistemological because it does not depend on a contingent
judgment that the views of the political departments are, in the specific
case at issue, likely to reflect the answer that a thorough, fully-informed
independent examination of the issue would yield. It is clear that the
founding generation expected that judicial review would generally be
Thayerian, but it is not at all dear that this expectation was grounded on a
legal rule built into the Constitution via "[t]hejudicial Power" rather than
on the (reasonable) supposition that the considered views of Congress and
the President would often warrant epistemological deference.
This critical distinction between legal and epistemological deference to
the views of other departments is actually a bit more complicated than we
have thus far suggested. Epistemological deference can often shade into
legal deference. A judge's primary obligation is to decide cases in
accordance with governing law. The obligation to apply governing law
carries with it an obligation to use one's best efforts to determine the

47. Chief Justice Marshall's determination in Mau Uy that it was unconstitutional for
Congress to permit the Supreme Court to exerdse original jurisdiction in cases beyond those
enumerated in Article III does not suggest Thayerian deference. See generaly Ak il Reed Amar,
Marbuiy, Section 13, and the Original Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 56 U. Chi. L Rev.
443, 482-83 (1989). Nor does the determination by three circuit courts in 1793 that Congress
could not require federal courts to decide pension claims subject to executive or legislative
revision. Hayburn's Case 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 408, 410-11 .n.* (1793); infra notes 229-35 and
accompanying text (discussing Haybura'sCase). Nor does the 1803 District of Columbia circuit
court decision that Congress could not, under Article mff, reduce the salary of ajustice of the
peace for the District of Columbia. See United States v. More, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 159, 160 n.*
(1805) (reprinting the 1803 opinion of the circuit court); Gary Lawmon, Territorial
Governments and the Limits of Formalism, 78 Cal. L. Rev. 853, 880-85 (1990) (discussing
More). The judicial determinations in all of these cases were probably correct, but the
determinations do not display a Thayerian attitude of deferring to Congress unless a statute is
unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.

THE EXECUTIVE POWER OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION

1279

governing law that one must apply. Judges thus have an interpretative
responsibility to try to get the right answer unless they are told by the
Constitution that that responsibility belongs to someone else. Suppose,
however, that a judge conscientiously determines that some other actor is
better suited than is the judge-by skill, knowledge, temperament, or
institutional position-to determine the right answer to a problem. In that
circumstance, the judge might well have a legal obligation to defer to the
other actor's interpretation, at least to the extent of accepting the other
actor's interpretation, unless it is very dearly wrong. Thus, seemingly
pragmatic arguments about individual or institutional competence to reach
correct constitutional interpretations can translate into legal arguments
because of judges' primary legal obligation to determine correctly the
applicable law.8 But these considerations do not translate into a case for
generalized legal deference to the political departments unless one can say,
as seems wholly implausible, that actors in the political departments will
always, simply by virtue of their status, be in a better position than are
judges to determine the right answers to constitutional questions. And
Thayerian review dearly contemplates this kind of categorical requirement
of deference.
Thus, it is doubtful that the federal courts' interpretative power is
limited by other provisions of the Constitution, such as the provisions
granting power to other constitutional actors. There is a respectable
historical and theoretical case for finding such limits and for concluding
that judicial review should therefore be Thayerian, but the best
interpretation of " [t ] hejudicial Power" vested in the federal courts yields a
power of constitutional interpretation that is at least presumptively legally
independent of the constitutional views of the other departments.4 9

II. THE PRESIDENT'S LAW-INTERPRETING POWERS
The President, unlike the federal courts, is granted a variety of
different powers by the Constitution. He is given the power to sign or

48. See infra notes 157-61 and accompanying text (discussing legal and epistemological
deference).
49. We say "presumptively" because it is possible that some but not all exercises of power
by other actors constrain the courts' law interpreting powers, or that some exercises of power
constrain more than do others. One could imagine, for example, arguing that courts have a
freer interpretative hand in the face of congressional interpretations of the postal power, see
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 7 (granting Congress power "t]o establish Post Offices and Post
Roads"), than they do in the face of presidential interpretations of the commander-in-chief
power. See U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 ("The President shall be Commander in Chief of the
Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into
the actual Service of the United States. .. ."). For a development of this idea of differential
deference in the context of individual rights, see Perry, supra note 4 (manuscript at 63-78).
We believe, however, that the Constitution accommodates these concerns through the
principle of epistemological deference rather than through any principle of legal deference.
50. The Constitution refers to the President by a generic male pronoun. We follow this
practice without endorsing it.
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veto bills, 1 to be commander in chief of the military,52 to request
opinions in writing from department heads, 53 to grant pardons for federal
crimes," to make treaties (with the advice and consent of the Senate), 5
to appoint officers of the United States,5 to make legislative recommendations to Congress, 7 and to convene or adjourn Congress under certain
circumstances.f 8 He is also charged with the duties, and presumably
granted the correlative powers, to give Congress information on the state
of the union, 9 to receive ambassadors, 60 and to commission federal
officers.0 ' In addition, the first sentence of Article II vests the President
with "[t]he executive Power,"6 2 and the President is elsewhere charged
with the duty to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed."6
Many of these powers require law interpretation and thus indirectly
empower the President, in contexts involving the exercise of those powers,
to interpret the laws, including the positive law of the Constitution. The
President must, for example, interpret laws, including the Constitution, in
deciding whether to sign or veto bills; he must interpret the laws, including
the Constitution, in determining whether to grant pardons; and he must
interpret the laws, including the Constitution, in making legislative
recommendations. As with the interpretative power of courts, however, the
President's power in these contexts is not a free-standing power of law
interpretation, but is instead tied to the exercise of specific granted powers
that carry a power of law interpretation as a necessary implication.
One of the President's most important functions is to execute the civil
and criminal laws of the United States. This is the context in which the
President's powers of law interpretation are perhaps most frequently
invoked, and it is the context in which the debate over executive
constitutional review-the President's power vel non to make and act upon
constitutional judgments independently of the constitutional views of other
departments-has primarily taken place. Accordingly, we now explore the
sources of and limits on the President's power to execute the laws, with
particular attention to the scope of and limits on the interpretative
authority that accompanies such power.

51. U.S. Const. art. I, § 7, cls. 2-3.
52, Id. art. II, § 2, cl.1.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. art. II, § 2, cl.2.
56. U.S. Const art. II, § 2, cls. 2-3. There are three different modes of appointment
(appointment with Senate confirmation, appointment without Senate confirmation, and recess
appointment), the details of which are not important here.

57. Id. art. II, § 3.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.

61.

U.S. ConsL art. 1, § 3.

62.
63.

Id. artII, § 1, d. 1.
Id. art. II, § 3.
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A. The Vesting Clause as a Source of Power
As noted above,6 Sections 2 and 3 of Article II of the Constitution
grant to the President a number of specific powers. In addition to those
specific powers, however, Section 1 of Article II provides that "[t]he
executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of
America."' As with the other grants of power to the President, this clause
grants to the President a specific, enumerated power. "[Tihe executive
Power." The only difference between this power grant and the President's
other power grants in Article II (and Article If) is that "the executive
Power" is perhaps less well defined than, for example, the power to grant
pardons or to make treaties. But while this difference may present some
interesting problems of interpretation, it does not affect the status of the
Article II Vesting Clause as a grant of power.
Although a number of scholars have denied that the Article II Vesting
Clause is a grant of executive power to the President, insisting instead that
the clause is merely a titular designation of the office of the presidency
and a declaration that there shall be only one holder of that office at any
time,67 the case for construing the Vesting Clause as a grant of the
executive power is simply overwhelming. Many of the arguments for
construing the Article II Vesting Clause as a grant of power were recently
collected and developed by Professor Steve Calabresi.'s We briefly outline
some of those arguments here.
First, the Vesting Clause does not say that "[t]he office of the
presidency shall be held by a President of the United States of America."
Rather, it says that "[t]he executive Power shall be vested in a President of
the United States of America."69 It is very hard to read a clause that
speaks of vesting power in a particular actor as doing anything other than
vesting power in a particular actor.
Second, as Professor Calabresi has pointed out, the plain meaning of
the verb "to vest" involves clothing with power or conferring ownership.
This conclusion is confirmed by dictionaries from 1755 to the present.70
Third, other clauses of the Constitution that use the term "vest'
clearly use the term to describe the granting of power. The Sweeping
Clause provides that Congress may pass necessary and proper laws for

64. See supra notes 51-63 and accompanying text.
65. U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, di. 1.
66. Article I grants to the President the power to sign or veto bills. See id. art. I, § 7, cls.
2-3.
67. For lists of modem scholars who have taken such a position, see, e.g., Calabresi, supra
note 16, at 1377 n.1; Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 Harv.L.
Rev. 1231, 1243 n.68 (1994).
68. See Calabresi, supra note 16, at 1378-1400 (discussing these arguments); see also
Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 10, at 570-79 (extending these arguments).
69. U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, ci. 1.
70. See Calabresi, supra note 16, at 1380-81 (discussing these various sources).
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carrying into execution the powers enumerated in Article I, Section 8 "and
all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the
United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof."7' The Sweeping
Clause dearly contemplates the vesting of power-real governmental
power-in various entities; indeed, the Article II Vesting Clause is one of
the obvious candidates for a clause that vests power "in the Government of
the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof." Moreover, the
Appointments Clause, after generally requiring presidential nomination
and Senate confirmation for the appointment of officers of the United
States, declares that "Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such
inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the
Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments."7 2 It is impossible to read

this clause as doing anything other than permitting Congress to empower
certain officials to appoint inferior officers without Senate confirmation.
Fourth, and finally, the Vesting Clause of Article III, which is textually
and structurally very similar to the Vesting Clause of Article W s is the
only constitutional source of the federal judiciary's power to act.74
Because the Article III Vesting Clause must be read as a grant of
power-the judicial power-to the federal courts, the analogous Article II
Vesting Clause should similarly be read as a grant of power-the executive
power-to the President. "
B. The Contours of the Executive Power
It is not clear why so many respected scholars have sought to deny the
obvious: that the Constitution vests a particular kind of power-the

executive power-in the President. 7' Perhaps they fear that a general
executive power is too indefinite and that presidents might seek to expand
their powers tyrannically by, for example, claiming the power to seize steel
mills or to impound appropriated funds. Even if such fears are warranted,

71. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, ci. 18 (emphasis added).
2 (emphasis added).
72. Id. arL II, § 2, cl.
73. For the classic analysis of the relationship between tie Vesting Clauses of Article II
and Article H1, see generally Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 6.
74. See supra notes 14-25 and accompanying text (discussing why Article HI is the source
of the federal courts' power to interpret the law).
75. By contrast, the Article I Vesting Clause provides that "[a]ll legislative Powers herein
granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States...." US. Const art. I, § 1
(emphasis added). The phrase "herein granted" means that Congress does not possess general
legislative power, but only those specific legislative powers granted elsewhere in the document.
By contrast, the vesting clauses of Articles II and II grant to the President and the federal
courts, respectively, the general executive andjudicial powers.
76. Hamilton's failure in The Federalist to mention the Vesting Clause when discussing
the President's powers presents the strongest argument against reading the clause as a power
grant. See Lawrence Lessig & Ca s It Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94
Colum. L Rev. 1, 49 (1994) ("[N]ot even Hamilton described the Vesting Clause as an
Independent source of substantive executive power, though he was generally quite eager to
define a strong executive."). For a response to this argument, see Calabresi &Prakash, supra
note 10, at 612.
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they would not justify reading out of the Constitution a power that is
dearly granted (although it perhaps would justify amending the
Constitution or discarding it altogether). But such fears are overstated. A
generalpower is not necessarily an unlimited power. The federal courts, for
example, are granted a general judicial power, but that power is confined
by its nature to a power to decide cases and controversies within the
courts' limited jurisdictions, in accordance with governing law. Similarly,
the Article II Vesting Clause grants to the President the executive power,
but only the executive power.
Nonetheless, it is true that the scope of the executive power is not as
well understood as the scope of many other constitutional powers." In
the face of the Constitution's careful enumeration of congressional powers,
the grant to the President of the executive power seems uncharacteristically vague. As one nineteenth-century scholar put it:
The most defective part of the Constitution beyond all
question, is that which relates to the Executive Department. It is
impossible to read [the Constitution], without being struck with
the loose and unguarded terms in which the powers and duties of
the President are pointed out. So far as the legislature is
concerned, the limitations of the Constitution, are, perhaps, as
precise and strict as they could safely have been made; but in
regard to the Executive, the Convention appears to have
studiously selected such loose and general expressions as would
enable the President, by implication and 8construction either to
neglect his duties or to enlarge his powers.
There are at least three possible explanations for the Constitution's
failure to define more precisely the scope of the executive power. One
possible explanation is that the nature of the executive power was so well
understood by those who drafted and ratified the document that further
explanation was deemed unnecessary, and that it was understood to be
limited enough in its nature so that a precise enumeration of all executive
functions was not considered important. The very specific enumerations of
the legislative powers granted to Congress, by contrast, manifested real
concerns about the potentially limitless character of "the legislative power"
in its general form and about the tendency of the legislature to encroach
on the other departments.79

77. SeeAntoninJ. Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. Cin. L Rev. 849, 852 (1989).

78. Abel P. Upshur, A Brief Inquiry into the True Nature and Character of Our Federal
Government 116-17 (Da Capo 1971) (Petersburg, Edmund &Julian C. Ruffin eds., 1840).

79. As Chancellor Kent stated.
The power of making laws is the supreme power in a state, and the
department in which it resides will naturally have such a preponderance in the
political system, and act with such mighty force upon the public mind, that the line
of separation between that and the other branches of the government ought to be
marked very distinctly, and with the most careful precision.
1 James Kent, Commentaries 207-10 (1826), reprinted in 2 The Founders' Constitution 39
(Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987).
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Another possible explanation is that the Constitution deliberately left
the executive power loosely defined so that it might acquire definition
through the representative process in which the people elect or reject
candidates for the presidency partly based on their conceptions of the
executive power. The people would thus define the executive power over
time through their approval or disapproval of certain actions by the
executive department.
A third, and perhaps better, explanation for the broad grant of
executive power is a combination of the preceding explanations. That is,
there could have been consensus in 1789 about the core of the executive
power, dissensus about the margins, and a willingness to let posterity
determine the ultimate boundaries. Viewed in this light, the executive
power is simultaneously murky and precise; certain areas were well defined
in 1789 and others awaited, and perhaps still await, the imprimatur of the
people.
We need not, and do not here intend to, define the precise contours
of "[t]he executive Power" that is granted to the President by Article II's
Vesting Clause. 0 Rather, our primary concern is with a power that is part
of the indisputable core of the executive power: the power to execute the
laws of the United States.
C. The President'sPower to Execute the Laws
The executive power includes the power to execute-to carry into
effect-the civil and criminal laws of the United States."' The point seems
obvious, and we will not belabor it.
First, the President is charged by the Constitution to "take Care that
the Laws be faithfully executed." 82 This duty plainly requires some
presidential power over, and hence responsibility for, the execution of the
laws.8" More fundamentally, the plain meaning of the words in the Article
II Vesting Clause, as explicated both in a dictionary contemporary with the
drafting of the Constitution and the most recent Oxford English
Dictionary, demonstrates the clause to be a grant of power to carry the

80. The authors, for example, do not completely agree on the best reading of the
available materials. Mr. Moore thinks that a respectable historical case can be made for an
inherent presidential power of unilateral action to promote the public good in emergency
circumstances in which the coordinate departments have failed to act, cf John Locke, Second
Treatise on Civil Government §§ 159-60 (1689), rpinted in 3 The Founders' Constitution 488
(Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987), while Professor Lawson is dubious. For a good
Introduction to the debate, and a thoughtful defense of an executive power that extends only
minimally beyond the power to execute the laws, see Henry P. Monaghan, The Protective
Power of the Presidency, 93 Colum. L. Rev. 1 (1993).
81. See Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 10, at 617.
82. U.S. Const. art. II, § 3.
83. One should not, however, draw too many conclusions about presidential power from
the Take Care Clause. The clause is consistent both with a direct presidential power of law
execution and with a mere presidential power of supervision over other actors who have
direct power to execute the laws.
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laws into effect 84 Finally, it was dear to eighteenth-century scholars of
government that the executive power included the power to carry the laws
into effect.s
The executive power includes both the power to carry into effect
federal statutes and the power to carry into effect the judgments of the
federal courts. This obvious conclusion is supported by powerful linguistic
and historical considerations. Samuel Johnson's Dictionary defined
"executive" as "having the power to put into act the laws";6 "law" in turn
was defined as "[a] decree, edict, statute, or custom, publicly established
as a rule of justice" and as "U]udicial process"; and "decree" includes
"[a] determination of a suit, or litigated cause."8
The modem Oxford English Dictionaiy confirms Johnson's analysis: it
defines "executive" as, inter alia, "the distinctive epithet of that branch of
the government which is concerned or charged with carrying out the laws,
decrees, and judicial sentences ... ."89 Moreover, Alexander Hamilton,
writing in The Federalist, made dear that the executive power comprises the
power to enforce judgments of the courts:
The executive not only dispenses the honors, but holds the
sword of the community.... Thejudiciary on the contrary has no
influence over either the sword or the purse, no direction either
of the strength or of the wealth of the society, and can take no
active resolution whatever. It may truly be said to be to have
84. Samuel Johnson's 1785 Dictionary defined "executive" as follows:
Executive. adj. [from execute]

1. Having the quality of executing or performing.
2. Active; not deliberative; not legislative; having the power to put in act the laws.
Samuel Johnson, A Dictionary of the English Language (7th ed. 1785) (italics in original).
The Oxford English Dictionary defines "executive" as follows:

A.adj.
3. a. Pertaining to execution; having the function of executing or carrying into
practical effect.
b. esp. as the distinctive epithet of that branch of the government which is concerned
or charged with carrying out the laws, decrees, and judicial sentences; opposed to
'judicial' and 'legislative'.

B. sb.
1. a. That branch of the government which is charged with the execution of the laws.
b. The person or persons in whom the supreme executive
magistracy of a country or state is vested. Chiefly U.S., applied to the President (also
called chief executive), and to the governors of states.
5 The Oxford English Dictionary 522 (2d ed. 1989).
85. See Calabresi &aPrakash, supra note 10, at 605-11.
86. Johnson, supra note 84.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. 5 Oxford English Dictionary, supra note 84, at 522.
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neither Force nor Will, but merely judgment; and must ultimately
depend upon the aid of the executive arm even for the efficacy of
its judgments.90
D. The President'sPower to Interpret the Laws: Sources
Just as the federal courts' power to resolve cases and controversies
within their jurisdiction includes the power to interpret the laws, the
President's power to execute the laws necessarily includes the power to
interpret them. As Judge Easterbrook has written, "[n]o one would take
seriously an assertion that the President may not interpret federal law.
After all, the President must carry out the law, and Iaithful execution is the
application of law to facts. Before he can implement he must interpret." 91
This interpretative process has two stages. First, the President must
resolve any ambiguities inherent in the law or decision itself. For example,
if a federal court ordered that a criminal defendant forfeit one thousand
dollars to the United States, the executive department would have to
determine whether the court meant (as it almost certainly did) the
forfeited money to be United States dollars rather than, for example,
Australian dollars.9 2 If Congress passes a statute creating a regulatory
scheme and delegating to the President authority to implement it, then the
President must interpret the statutory framework in deciding how best to
carry the law into effect.9' The process of exercising the executive power
often requires interpretation, as neither the legislature nor the judiciary
will always provide sufficient specificity to render such interpretation
unnecessary.

90. The Federalist No. 78, at 522-23 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
91. Easterbrook, supra note 4, at 905; see also Miller, supra note 4. at 50 ("The
proposition that the president's power to execute the law includes a power of interpretation
should be universally accepted.").
92. We are indebted to Professor Thomas W. Merrill for this example.
93. The law in question may be so vague that the President's interpretative power shades
into the legislative power. Because the President has only the executive power, with its
accompanying power of interpretation, the President cannot constitutionally execute a statute
that cannot be interpreted. We do not address here how to draw the boundaries between
interpretation and legislation. Compare Lawson, supra note 67, at 1239 (arguing that Congress
cannot delegate legislative functions and must make "whatever policy decisions are sufficiently
important to the statutory scheme at issue so that Congress must make them") with Martin H.
Redish, The Constitution as Political Structure 136 (1995) (arguing that valid statutes must
evince "some meaningful level of normative political commitment by the enacting legislators,
thus enabling the electorate to judge its representatives") and David Schoenbrod, Power
Without Responsibility: How Congress Abuses the People Through Delegation 183 (1993)
("[A] person interested in knowing whether the statute prohibits any given conduct will, in
most cases, get a clear answer from the statute that states the law, but may well get no answer,
for any particular case, from a statute that delegates"). See generally Gary Lawson, Who
Legislates?, 1995 Pub. Int'l L. Rev. 147 (reviewing Schoenbrod, supra, and discussing the
constitutional sources and contours of the nondelegation principle).
It is also possible that ajudicial judgment could be so ambiguous that execution of that
judgment would require exercise ofjudicial rather than executive power and would thus raise
delegation concerns.
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Once the President has interpreted the law that he has the power to
enforce or execute, a second interpretative stage emerges: the President
must then determine whether the law is consistent with the Constitution.
The President, no less than Congress or the courts, operates under the
Constitution as supreme positive law. The prima facie case for executive
review-for presidential assessment of whether a law is in conflict with the
Constitution and should be given effect in a particular case-is precisely
coterminous with the case for judicial review.94 The need to interpret the
Constitution as a source of positive law, and to prefer the Constitution to
any other source of law with which it may conflict, is as much a part of
"[t]he executive Power" vested in the President as it is part of "[t]he
judicial Power" vested in the federal courts. The Constitution is law, and
the executive power of law interpretation includes the power and duty to
interpret the Constitution.
The interesting question concerning presidential review is not whether
the President has the power to interpret the Constitution (he does), or
when that power can be exercised (as an incident to the President's
enumerated powers, including the executive power), but how the
Constitution requires or permits that power to be exercised. Is the
President bound, or otherwise constrained, by prior legislative or judicial
interpretations of the Constitution? In other words, should presidential
review be Thayerian or independent?
The prima facie case for independence in presidential interpretations
of the Constitution is analogous to the case for independence in judicial
interpretations of the Constitution:29 the executive department is
coordinate with the other departments, presidential review is part of a
system of checks and balances, the other departments should not be judges
in their own causes, and the President takes a constitutionally-prescribed
oath to uphold the Constitution.9 6 An analysis of the President's
interpretative powers, however, proves to be much more complicated than
is a similar analysis of the interpretative powers of the federal courts. The
President's interpretative powers arise in many more contexts than do the
courts' similar powers, and a number of textual and structural features of
the Constitution raise questions about limitations on the power of
presidential review that do not apply to the analogous power of judicial
review. A comprehensive discussion of the President's interpretative powers

94.

See Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch, supra note 4, at 267 (noting that the

President's duty to interpret the law in order to "take care" that the laws be "faithfully

executed" under the Constitution obligates him to refuse to enforce a statute he finds
contrary to the Constitution as paramount law).

95. See supra notes 26-49 and accompanying text (discussing the degree of independence
judicial interpretation should involve).
96.

See U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, c. 8 (stating that the President must swear or affirm: "'Ido

solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the Office of President of the United
States, and will to the best of my Ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the
United States.'").
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must therefore consider separately each context in which that power arises

and all the possible limitations that the Constitution might place upon that
power.
E. The President's Power to Interpret the Laws: Limits
Although the exercise of any of the President's constitutional powers

can give rise to the need for constitutional interpretation, 9 there are four
presidential powers that most obviously implicate the President's
interpretative power: the power to sign or veto proposed legislation, the
power to grant pardons for federal crimes, the power to execute federal
statutes, and the power to execute federal court judgmens. In each of
these cases, the President must act after one or more of the other
departments (and perhaps one or more presidents) has already acted by
proposing legislation, passing a statute, and/or issuing a judgment.
Accordingly, each of these contexts raises the question whether the
President's interpretative powers are constrained by the interpretations of
other actors.s We consider in each context whether the presumptive case
for independent presidential review can be overcome by textual or
structural features of the Constitution.
1. Presentment
a. CongressionalDeterminations
When Congress sends a bill to the President for signature, Congress
will ordinarily have determined, at least implicitly, that the bill would be
constitutional if it became a law.9 If the President thinks the bill is
unconstitutional, is he nonetheless bound to sign the bill if he determines
that Congress believes the bill to be constitutional?
No serious student of the Constitution thinks-or we believe has ever
thought-that the President has no power to veto legislation on
constitutional grounds. The founding generation wondered whether the

97. For example, in exercising the commander-in-chief power, the President must
determine when and whether he needs congressional authorization for military action; in
exercising the recommendation power, the President must insure that his proposals are
constitutional; and in exercising the commission power, the President must determine who is
an "Officer[] of the United States" to whom a commission must be given.
98. Professor Paulsen, for similar reasons, focuses on these contexts while acknowledging
the need for constitutional interpretation in the exercise of other powers. See Paulsen, The
Most Dangerous Branch, supra note 4, at 263 n.167 (discussing the legal interpretation of laws
by the executive branch).
99. This is not inevitable. Congress may be unsure about the constitutionality of its
proposed legislation and may want the President's input in a context in which the decision
matters, Congress may know that the bill will be unconstitutional if enacted but may be
pandering to the uninformed or impassioned will of voters; or Congress may be deliberately
testing the President's mettle. Nonetheless, it is a decent working presumption that
congressional legislative action constitutes an implicit, and sometimes explicit, judgment of
constitutionality.
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President could veto bills on nonconstitutional grounds, 1" and modem
scholars wonder whether the President must veto bills that contain
provisions that he deems unconstitutional,'O° but no one argues that the
President is forbidden from issuing vetoes on constitutional grounds. The
real issue is whether the President can exercise independentjudgment when
assessing the constitutionality of proposed legislation, or must he give
deference to the previously-expressed views of Congress? The President, of
course, may and should defer to Congress if he determines that Congress
is more likely than he to have reached the right answer, but is the
President legally obliged to give weight to Congress's judgment?
Nothing in the Constitution rebuts the prima fade case for
independent presidential review in this context. The Presentment Clauses
themselves are silent, and the Article I Vesting Clause, the only other
provision of the Constitution that seems to be implicated in this context,
does not require deference-indeed it requires it considerably less than it
requires judicial deference to legislative judgments in the context of
judicial review. °2
Nor can Congress use its power under the Sweeping Clause to require
presidential deference by, for example, passing a statute that forbids
presidential vetoes on constitutional grounds or that specifies that
presidential vetoes may only be issued on constitutional grounds when
Congress has made, in Thayer's terms, an error "so dear that it is not open
to rational question."' 03 It is true that the Sweeping Clause gives Congress
power to pass all laws that are "necessary and proper for carrying into
Execution" not only its own powers, but also "all other Powers vested by
this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any
Department or Officer thereof." °4 The veto power is dearly a power
vested by the Constitution in a federal "Officer," and the hypothetical
statutes under discussion are at least arguably laws "for carrying into
Execution" that power. Such laws, however, are not "necessary and proper"
for that purpose and therefore exceed Congress's granted powers. It is not
dear that such laws meet even a minimal standard of necessity,'"5 and it

100. See Easterbrook, supra note 4, at 907-08 (tracing the history of presidential vetoes
under Presidents Washington, Madison, and Jackson, which leads to an assumption that the
veto should be exercised only on constitutional grounds).
101. For a definitive discussion, see Rappaport, supra note 4, at 771-76.
102. There is no historical evidence which suggests that presidents must defer to Congress
in a legislative process. However, there is historical evidence suggesting that courts engaged in
judicial review should adopt a deferential stance toward legislation. The case for judicial
deference to congressional judgments is much stronger than the case for presidential
deference to congressional judgments.
103. Thayer, supra note 26, at 144.
104. U.S. Const. art. II, § 8, cl. 18.
105. The word "necessary" in the Sweeping Clause probably means "helpful"-more or less
the way that ChiefJustice Marshall defined it in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)
316, 413-20 (1819). See Lawson & Granger, supra note 11, at 286-89 (briefly discussing the
meaning of "necessary" in the context of the Sweeping Clause). A statute limiting the grounds
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is very dear that they do not satisfy the constitutional requirement of
propriety. As Professor Lawson and Patty Granger have elsewhere
explained at length, a "proper" law under the Sweeping Clause must
respect the jurisdictional boundaries set up by the Constitution, including
the boundaries among the three departments of the national govern0
ment."'
In other words, legislation under the Sweeping Clause must
conform to a "proper" understanding of separation of powers. If we have
correctly determined here that a power of independent presidential review
is, at least presumptively, part of the Constitution's structure of separated
powers,
congressional legislation under the Sweeping Clause must
conform to that structure. Similarly, if we have correctly concluded that
there is a presumptive constitutional case for independent judicial review,
Congress could not, in the guise of "carrying into Execution" the judicial
power vested in the federal courts, require the federal courts to give

Thayerian deference to congressionaljudgments about the constitutionality
of legislation.' 3 The Sweeping Clause is a vehide for implementing the
powers allocated by the Constitution; it is not a vehicle for changing the

constitutional allocation.
b. JudicialDeterminations
Accordingly, there is no congressional power that can overcome the
presumptive case for independent presidential review of congressional
judgments of constitutionality in the context of the veto power. But what
about exercises of the judicial power? Suppose that legislation is presented
to the President, who must make a judgment about its constitutionality.
Suppose further that the Supreme Court has previously passed on the
constitutionality of legislation that everyone in the legal community agrees

on which the President can issue vetoes, some would argue, is hurtful to the exercise of the
President's vested power-as contrasted, for example, with laws that appropriate funds for the
purchase of veto pens or for the hiring of legal staff to advise the President on proposed
legislation.
106. See Lawson & Granger, supra note 11.
107. See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text (describing the role of presidential
interpretation).
108. Congress can, of course, control (within limits) the jurisdiction of the federal courts,
and can thus control the occasions in which the judicial power is exercised, but that is a very
different power than the power to control the mannerin which the judicial power is exercised
in cases properly within the courts' jurisdiction. Similarly, because Congress determines
whether and when bills will be sent to the President for signature, Congress controls the
occasions in which the President's veto power can be exercised, but that does not mean that
Congress also has power to control the manner in which the President can exercise that
power when the occasion for its exercise arises.
This Article analyzes the limits of Congress's power to regulate the manner in which
courts or the President conduct business. The Artide does not comment, for example, on
such things as congressionally-prescribed quorum requirements for Supreme Courtjudgments
or congressional limitations on judicial remedies. We are grateful to Evan Caminker for these
examples of "borderline" congressional regulation ofjudicial affairs.
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is identical in all relevant respects to the bill under consideration, so that
by conventional understandings of precedent, the previous decision is
squarely on point. 1 9 May the President-or Congress, in the exercise of
its power to propose legislation (or, with a two-thirds majority, to enact it
over the President's objections)--nonetheless exercise independent
judgment about the legislation's constitutionality?
Although presidents and legislators considering the enactment of
legislation have occasionally been criticized for making constitutional
judgments that are arguably inconsistent with prior court decisions,"'
there has been little controversy over independent presidential exercises of
interpretative power in the legislative process."' Nonetheless, there are
deep currents in our legal culture that are suspicious of, if not openly
hostile to, independent presidential review even in the presentment
context. It is well understood that presidents can, and even should,
consider the constitutionality of legislation before signing it, but we suspect
that the ordinary expectation in much of our legal community is that such
constitutional review will consist of a careful study of court decisions on
the relevant question-much the same way that courts themselves typically
address such questions. In other words, while no one really doubts that
Congress and the President, in their legislative capacities, have the power
and duty to consider the constitutionality of their actions, "constitutionality" is often taken to mean "consistency with Supreme Court (and perhaps
lower federal court) decisions about the Constitution."1 2 In particular,
we doubt whether the legal community is prepared to swallow whole the
idea that, in presidential deliberations about the proper exercise of the
presentment power, Supreme Court decisions need not play any larger role
than do law review articles or memoranda from staff attorneys in the
Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel.

109. This annuls the problem of presidential interpretations of precedent-the first step of
the two-step process of presidential interpretation. Sew supra notes 91-92 and accompanying
text (discussing the "first step" of presidential interpretation). Before one considers the effects
of ajudicial decision, one needs to know what the decision says.
110. In 1832 Daniel Webster sharply criticized AndrewJackson's bank bill veto because
Jackson did not accept as dispositive Supreme Court decisions upholding Congress's power to
charter a national bank, see Daniel Webster, Great Speeches and Orations of Daniel Webster
329-31 (Edwin P. Whipple ed., 1879); and in 1985 Daniel Manion, now ajudge of the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals, was attacked during his Senate confirmation hearings for supporting
legislation as a state legislator that would have permitted the posting of the Ten Commandments in Indiana schools in a fashion that arguably would have failed the Supreme Court's
constitutional test for establishments of religion. See Meese, supra note 1, at 987-88 (discussing
the attack on Daniel Manion during his Senate confirmation hearing).
111. See Easterbrook, supra note 4, at 907 (describing vetoes based on presidential
interpretations of the Constitution at variance with prior court interpretations as
"uncontroversial"); Paulsen, The Menyman Power, supra note 4, at 81 ("It is also widely
recognized that the President may veto a bill for any reason or no reason at all, including
constitutional reasons previously rejected by the Supreme Court").
112. See Paul Brest, Who Decides?, 58 S. Cal. L Rev. 661, 670 (1985) ("The belief in
judicial exclusivity is so widespread that it is usually assumed rather than argued for.").
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Indeed, until very recently, judicial and academic commentary on
presidential review largely reflected this expectation that presidential (and
presumably congressional) constitutional interpretation would consist
primarily of interpretation of court decisions rather than of independent
analysis of whether those court decisions represent correct interpretations
of the Constitution. The commentators did not, as a rule, specifically deal
with the exercise of the presentment power, but rather with presidential
refusals to execute statutes or to acquiesce in circuit court interpretations
of statutes. As we shall see, these contexts raise concerns about the
President's obligations under the Take Care Clause"- and about the
meaning and scope of the finality of judicial judgments that are not
implicated by exercises of the presentment power." 4 Nonetheless, many
of the arguments against independent presidential review advanced in the
nonenforcement or nonacquiescence contexts seem directly pertinent to
the question whether presidents may (or must) exercise independent
judgment in the exercise of the presentment power. Indeed, precisely
because the presentment context involves fewer complications than do
other instances of presidential law interpretation, it is a good place to take
a first look at the case for judicial supremacy in constitutional interpretation.
The only provision of the Constitution that could conceivably
generate a presidential obligation to defer to federal court decisionmaking
is the Article III Vesting Clause, which vests "[t]he judicial Power of the
United States" in the federal courts." 5 But while the Article III Vesting
Clause is strong enough to support a case for independent judicial review
in the overall context of the Constitution, it is very hard to see how it can
support a case for judicial supremacy in the interpretation of the laws. The
judicial power-the power to resolve cases or controversies in accordance
with governing law-certainly includes the power of law interpretation, but
the powers vested in the President (and Congress) similarly include powers
of law interpretation. We are aware of no one who has even attempted to
put forth a plausible originalist case for a generalized judicial supremacy in
constitutional interpretation." 6 Instead, those who defend judicial
supremacy (with anything other than hot air and bluster) have done so on
grounds unrelated to the Constitution's original public meaning. We
explore here some of the most interesting and sophisticated arguments for

113. See U.S. Const. art. II, § 3, cl. 4 (stating that the President "shall take Care that the
Laws be faithfully executed").
114. See infra notes 211-74 and accompanying text (discussing the Take Care Clause and
the finality ofjudicial judgments).
115. U.S. Const. art. III, § 1, cl. 1. The Sweeping Clause does not help, as Congress can no
more order the President to defer to court decisions than it can order the President to defer
to congressional decisions. See supra notes 102-106 and accompanying text.
116. As we shall see, some people have put forward an originalist case for judicial
supremacy in some specific contexts, and we make a modest case for such limited supremacy
here. See infra notes 242-74 and accompanying text.

THE EXECUTIVE POWER OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION

1293

judicial supremacy.
Professor Burt Neuborne, for example, has argued for the strong view
the 'law' that is
that "[o]nce article III restrictions are satisfied ....
the Constitution
construing
declared by a Supreme Court judicial decision
a binding norm
but
conduct,
judicial
is not merely a prediction of future
117
Professor
Under
that operates at the level of positive prescription."
the
Constitution,
Neuborne's analysis, the President owes an obligation to
but the "Constitution" is precisely what the courts construe it to be."'8
Professor Neuborne offers three arguments-which he describes as
"functional, jurisprudential, and historical" n--in support of this vision of
judicial supremacy in the interpretation of the Constitution. None of these

arguments are ultimately persuasive, and, more importantly for our
purposes, none purport to be based on a sound originalist understanding
of the Constitution.
Professor Neuborne's historical argument can be disposed of most
quickly. He insists that "courts have repeatedly and explicitly ruled that the
government is obliged to comply with settled judicial precedent construing
the Constitution or a statute,"120 invoking in particular the Supreme
Court's declaration in Cooper v. Aaron12 1 that "the federal judiciary is
supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution" 22 and a raft of
recent circuit court decisions advancing the same claim.Iss The argument,
of course, clearly begs the question.'24 The pronouncements of the courts
can no more settle this question than can the pronouncements of
presidents 2--at least, not unless the judicial supremacist position has

117. Neubome, supra note 2, at 998-99; see also id. at 993 ("[O]nce the Supreme Court, or
a circuit court for that matter, enunciates a settled rule of law,... in the context of resolving
an article III case or controversy, our system of government obliges executive officials to
comply with the law as judicially declared.").
118. Professor Neubome was writing specifically about presidential enforcement of
statutes. It is not at all dear that Professor Neubome would extend his position to the
presentment context, see Burt Neubome, Panel: The Role of the Legislative and Executive
Branches in Interpreting the Constitution, 73 Cornell L Rev. 375, 376-77 (1988), but we think
it useful to consider his reasoning in that context.
119. Neubome, supra note 2, at 994.
120. Id. at 1000.
121. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
122. Id. at 18; see also id. (referring to the Supreme Court's interpretation of the
Fourteenth Amendment as "the supreme law of the land" for purposes of the Supremacy
Clause).
123. See Neubome, supra note 2, at 1000-01 (discussing the validity of the judiciary's role
as the authoritative voice on Constitutional interpretation).
124. The argument has some internal flaws as well. The reasoning of earlier judicial
opinions, such as Marbury v. Madison, 5 US. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), supports a
departmentalist approach rather than a judicial supremacist approach, Cooper rests on a
misstatement of Marbuy, and modern lower court opinions that reaffirm judicial supremacy
rely on Cooper and Cooper's misreading of Masinry. Merrill, supra note 4, at 50-53.
125. For a sample of presidential assertions of independent interpretative authority, see
The Federalist Society, supra note 5, at 41-50, 71-73, 77-78, 87-91 (discussing statements by
Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, Abraham Lincoln, Ronald Reagan, and George Bush).
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already been established by other means.
Professor Neubome's functional argument is more interesting but

sheds no light on the meaning of the Constitution. He complains that
permitting each department to act on its own interpretation of the
Constitution rather than following one uniform interpretation makes it
more difficult for constitutional law to perform its function of guiding
behavior"1 and leads to inequality in legal outcomes, because people who
have the resources (or good fortune) to pursue their claims through more
than one department will have advantages over those who are too poor to
challenge initial decisions."2 These are reasons-although we think
wholly unpersuasive ones"2s-for constitution-makers to consider
adopting a model of one-department supremacy, but they shed no light on
the structure of law interpretation actually contained in the American
Constitution.
Professor Neubome's jurisprudential argument, however, merits
serious consideration. Professor Neubore correctly observes that the
constitutional case for departmentalism rests on the idea that the
Constitution has an objective, ascertainable meaning that is just as
accessible in principle to the President as to a court.1 29 But that is not, he
argues, a plausible understanding of the Constitution: "iT]here is no such
thing as an objectively knowable, 'true' Constitution just waiting to be
discovered." s Rather, at least in many hard cases, 1 the derivation of
constitutional meaning becomes a "complex institutional interplay between
an ambiguous text and the institution vested with responsibility to declare

126. Neuborne, supra note 2, at 994-96 (discussing the need for one authoritative voice for
interpretation).
127. Id. at 996-97. This argument from inequality is developed at more length in Dan T.
Coenen, The Constitutional Case Against Intracircuit Nonacquiescence, 75 Minn. L Rev.
1339, 1352-55 (1991).
128. If the goal is a uniform interpretation of the Constitution, then the President rather
than the courts is the ideal interpreter because the President is a unitary actor. See
Easterbrook, supra note 4, at 917-18. More fundamentally, however, the possibility of different
interpretations by different departments is a strength, not a weakness, of departmentalism, for
the same reasons that the division of legislative authority among the state and fediral
governments, two different federal departments (Congress and the President), and two
branches of Congress is a strength, not a weakness, of the constitutional separation of powers.
As for the problem of inequality among rich and poor: under a system of pure departmentalIsm, as under a system ofjudicial supremacy, all participants in the legal system face the same
formal rules for litigating claims. Wealthy litigants certainly have more opportunities~to pursue
appeals than do less wealthy persons, but that is no more startling or shocking than is the
realization that rich people in shopping malls that are formally open to everyone have more
opportunities to acquire goods than do poor people.
129. Neuborne, supra note 2, at 997. We say "inprinciple" because in prxtice some actors
may be better situated than others-by knowledge, skill, temperament, or position-to find
the answers to certain problems. Sew infra notes 157-61 and accompanying text. But it is
implausible to suppose that these contingent factors will, in all contexts and circumstances,
point to judges as the interpreters most likely to get the right answer.
130. Neuborne, supra note 2, at 997.
131. See Neuborne, supra note 118, at 378-79 (discussing the concept "h'ard cases").
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its meaning."' In other words, departmentalism rests on a view in which
the correctness of constitutional interpretations is determined by the
content of the interpretations rather than by the identity of the
interpreters. In Professor Neuborne's view, however, any plausible contentbased theory of interpretation will break down in a large number of cases
and fail to yield an answer. Because legal systems requireanswers to resolve
disputes, one must then look for answers in something other than the
content of the interpretation, and that can only be the identity of the
interpreter. It is obvious, continues Professor Neuborne, that if we must
choose one governmental institution as the authoritative interpreter of the
Constitution, that institution should be the federal judiciary, as "[u]nlike
the political branches, which are designed to reflect majority sentiment,
the judicial branch is insulated from political pressure to permit judges to
resolve disputes about the meaning of law in ways that protect the
politically weak as well as the strong."'1 3 Thus, on Professor Neubome's
understanding, an interpretation by the Supreme Court will in many
contexts be correct simply because it is the interpretation of the Supreme Court.
Congress and the President must, of course, interpret the Supreme Court's
interpretations, but once one unproblematically understands the Supreme
Court's decision, there is no separate question about whether the Court's
decision conforms to the Constitution. Accordingly, the President has no
power independently to interpret the Constitution in the face of ajudicial
construction, although he may, on Professor Neuborne's theory,
independently interpret the Constitution when the federal courts have not
yet spoken on the question at hand.1M
One might be tempted brusquely to dismiss Professor Neubome's
position as a nihilistic attack on constitutionalism, but that would be a
grave mistake. Professor Neubome has advanced a bona fide theory of
constitutional meaning that prescribes a mechanism for identifying right
answers to constitutional questions: first, look to the content of the
interpretations, and then, if that does not yield an answer, look to the
identity of the interpreters. Professor John Harrison, in a panel discussion
with Professor Neuborne, aptly summarized the relationship between
Professor Neuborne's approach and classical, content-based theories of
interpretation:
As I understand it, his position-which seems to me a
different and very interesting form of right answerism-involves a
two-stage theory of law. At the first stage, law is relatively clear and
definite, but it does not take you all the way to one right answer.
Instead, the first step imposes a constraint, it narrows you down
from thousands of possible answers to, for example, ten
possibilities. The second stage is driven by the need to come up
with a right answer, but it is limited by uncertainty and
132.
133.
134.

Neuborne, supra note 2, at 999.
Id. at 1000.
See Neuborne, supra note 118, at 375.
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complication: no one of the ten possibilities can be said to be
correct just on the basis of its content. So instead of a rule for
identifying the right answer based on the content of the answer,
at the second stage you have a rule based on the identity of the
answerer: what the Supreme Court says is correct by definition.
Thus, for Professor Neuborne, the reality of multiple plausible
answers combined with the need for one, single rule leads to the
conclusion that only one person can have the right answer: from
many truths, one view of the truth. My approach, which defines
correctness entirely in terms of content and not at all in terms of
the identity of the answerer, leads from one truth to multiple
permissible views. s
Nonetheless, Professor Neuborne's conception of constitutional
meaning, while intriguing, does not provide a persuasive argument against
departmentalism. Professor Neuborne's argument rests on the claimed
indeterminacy (or, rather, underdeterminacy) of content-based theories of
constitutional interpretation: he reasons that because (1) any plausible
content-based theory of interpretation cannot always provide a clear answer
to constitutional questions, and because (2) a legal theory must prescribe
clear answers to questions about constitutional meaning in order to resolve
constitutional cases, then (8) one must look for meaning in the
pronouncements of the Supreme Court as an authoritative interpreter.
Propositions (1) and (3) are highly debatable, and proposition (2) is
dearly false. ' s'
The degree to which a content-based theory of interpretation, such as
originalism, can generate dear answers to constitutional questions depends
on two considerations: how much certainty about constitutional meaning
originalism can produce and-although this point is often overlooked-how much certainty is required before an answer can be
pronounced "clear." If, for example, the meaning of a constitutional
provision in a given context cannot be said to be "dear" unless that
meaning has been established beyond a reasonable doubt, then there
might indeed be many questions for which even the most rigorously
defined and rigorously applied originalism cannot provide a "clear"
answer. Given a standard of proof that requires proof of constitutional
meaning beyond a reasonable doubt, even a very small amount of
uncertainty is enough to generate a lot of indeterminacy. But if all we mean
by a "clear" answer is an answer that is better than any available alternative
answer, then originalism could easily have a very high degree of determinacy

135. John Harrison et al., Panel: The Role of the Legislative and Executive Branches in
Interpreting the Constitution, 73 Cornell L Rev. 371, 399 (1988).
136. Obviously, a full treatment of the interesting jurisprudential implications of Professor
Neuborne's position would require a separate article. Fortunately, one of the authors has
already written it. Sew
Gary Lawson, Legal Indeterminacy: Its Cause and Cure, 19 Harv. J.L &
Pub. Pol'y 411 (1996). Our aim here is simply to offer enough preliminary considerations to
demonstrate that departmentalists need not be threatened by Professor Neuborne's challenge.
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even if one is not always certain about what the evidence of original
meaning shows.1 37 Accordingly, even if Professor Neuborne is right that
originalism necessarily yields a high degree of uncertainty about
constitutional meaning (and we are not at all prepared to concede that
point),'-" one cannot know whether uncertainty translates into indeterminacy unless one knows the applicable standard of proof for originalist claims
about constitutional meaning. Suffice it to say that it is conceivable that
Professor Neuborne is right about the degree of indeterminacy that
originalism necessarily produces, but the point is far more complex than
he acknowledges 9
Assume, however, that originalism generates some or even
considerable indeterminacy. It does not follow, as Professor Neuborne's
second proposition would have it, that originalism therefore cannot
prescribe the outcome of all constitutional cases, because one does not need
determinacy of legal meaning to decide cases. If one can determinately know
how the Constitution allocates the burden of proof on questions of
constitutional meaning, one can always resolve constitutional cases no
matter how much other indeterminacy about constitutional meaning there
may be, because whenever there is indeterminacy, the party that has the
burden of proof with respect to the indeterminate proposition loses.
Professor Lawson has elsewhere explained this point at length and has
demonstrated that originalism can indeed yield a determinate allocation 1of
40
the burden of proof for all questions of constitutional meaning.
Accordingly, the need to resolve disputes does not require a legal system to
go beyond originalism, even if originalism does not always (or even often)
yield determinate answers to questions of constitutional meaning.
Finally, even if one were inclined to look for an authoritative
interpreter of the Constitution whenever the search for objective legal
meaning breaks down, it is hardly obvious that the federal courts are the

137. Exactly how high a degree of determinacy could be achieved would depend, inter
alia, on the standard of proof that one applies to the determination of whether an answer is
better than its competitors. Does it need to be clear beyond a reasonable doubt that one
answer is better than its competitors? Is it enough that the best available conclusion is that
one answer is the best available conclusion about constitutional meaning, or should we apply

some intermediate standard of proof, such as a preponderance-of-the-evidence or a clear-andconvincing-evidence standard?
138. See, g., Thomas B. McAffee, Originalism and Indeterminacy, 19 Harv. J.L. & Pub.
Pol'y 429, 429 (1996) (arguing that originalism's indeterminacy is often overstated).
139. One of us has devoted a good portion of his professional life to exploring standards
of proof for legal claims and the relationship between uncertainty and indeterminacy in the
law, and we are not going to do more than raise the issue here. See generally Lawson, supra
note 136; Gary Lawson, Proving Ownership, 11 Soc. Phil. & Pol'y 139 (1994); Gary Lawson,
Proving the Law, 86 Nw. U. L. Rev. 859 (1992).
140. See Lawson, supra note 136, at 425-28 (stating that the federal government bears the
initial burden of affirmatively showing that it has the enumerated power to act, while
challengers of state action or of federal action within the national government's enumerated
powers bear the burden of showing that the Constitution affirmatively prohibits the action in
question).
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logical choice. Professor Neuborne emphasizes the judiciary's relative
insulation from political pressure, which permits judges "to resolve disputes
about the meaning of law in ways that protect the politically weak as well as
the strong." 41 Such insulation might well facilitate a search for an
objective legal meaning, but the whole thrust of Professor Neuborne's
argument is that we must often search for an authoritative interpreter
because the searchfor objective legal meaning often breaks down. On Professor
Neuborne's analysis, the cases in which we are interested are not cases that
lend themselves to detached, dispassionate, technical legal analysis. They
are cases in which "legal meaning" results from the process of interpretation itself, and they call for political-moral judgment. It is not at all dear
that insulation from the political process is a virtue in this context. If one
believes that political-moral decisionmaldng ideally involves detached,
dispassionate, technical analysis, then perhaps the judiciary's insulation
from political pressure would give it a comparative advantage over other
departments. But it is very hard to say with a straight face that politicalmoral reasoning is more detached, dispassionate, and technical, and leads
to more determinacy than, originalist constitutional interpretation.
A different, and more nuanced, case for judicial supremacy is offered
by Professor David Strauss. Professor Strauss, in a complex and subtle
argument, suggests that the President should presumptively treat Supreme
Court precedents in essentially the same fashion as does the Supreme
Court itself: precedents can be rejected, but only for very good reasons that
usually go beyond the perceived incorrectness of the original decision.142
Because there are important and complex institutional differences between
the courts and the presidency, Professor Strauss argues that one cannot
maintain a precise equivalence between the President's and the Court's
treatment of Court precedents.'4 But in a wide range of circumstances,
Professor Strauss would maintain that the President's interpretative
authority is constrained, often severely, by the Supreme Court's
constitutional interpretations.
Professor Strauss's position might best be described as moderate
departmentalism: in his view, even when the President's interpretative
power is constrained by court decisions, the constraint is not absolute; it
extends only as far as the constraints of precedent ever go.'4 In order to
reach this conclusion, however, Professor Strauss must reject a strong form
of departmentalism in which the President's interpretative authority is

141. Neuborne, supra note 2, at 1000.
142. Strauss, supra note 4, at 127-28.
143. Id. at 127-34.
144. Id. An interesting question under Professor Strauss's analysis is whether the
constraints of precedent are determined by the actual practice of the Supreme Court or by
some external theory of precedent. If,for example, the Court were to follow a practice of
absolutely abiding by precedent in all circumstances, would Professor Strauss maintain that
the President is bound to follow the same practice rather than the more flexible approach to
precedent that has thus far characterized American constitutional law?
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presumptively (or conclusively) independent of court decisions. His case
against a strong form of departmentalism is essentially coherentist: fullblown departmentalism entails certain consequences that most
departmentalists do not accept.'4 Professor Strauss, however, misjudges
both departmentalism and many departmentalists.
First, Professor Strauss insists that executive interpretative autonomy is
inconsistent with the law of qualified immunity, under which executive
officials are liable in damages for violation of "dearly established"
constitutional rights, where "dearly established" is determined by reference
to court decisions. 46 According to Professor Strauss, consistent
departmentalists must object to this aspect of qualified immunity doctrine,
and none have done so. As Tom Merrill has pointed out, however, the fact
that courts regard judicial decisions as the touchstone of "dearly established
law" says nothing about whether executive officials have a legal (rather
than practical) obligation to go along with them.' 47 In any event, to the
extent that official immunity doctrine reflects a claim of judicial
supremacy, we are confident that all departmentalists would object to the
judiciary's arrogation of interpretative power in this context as much as in
any other context.
Second, Professor Strauss points out that virtually all insist that the
President has a binding legal obligation to enforce court judgments
rendered in specific cases. 48 This insistence seems to be inconsistent with
the claim of executive interpretative autonomy, and no departmentalist has
yet explained why court judgments are different from court precedents with

anything more powerful than the mere assertion that "[t]he judicial
Power" must be read to bind the executive to enforce judgments. 9 In
order to be consistent, says Professor Strauss, departmentalists either must
accept the view that presidents are not legally bound to enforce court
judgments or must explain why judgments in specific cases are
constitutionally different from all other legal entities in this respect.
Professor Strauss's two main points are correct: a prima fade case for
executive interpretative autonomy does extend to court judgments in
specific cases, and no departmentalist has yet carefully explored the
meaning of "[the judicial Power" to see if the prima facie case for
executive autonomy can be rebutted in the context of enforcement of.
judgments. One of our goals in this Article is to examine these issues in
some depth and to provide a sound originalist case for treating court
judgments differently than other legal entities.

145. Id. at 120-27.
146. Id. at 123.
147. Merrill, supra note 4, at 72 n.131.
148. Strauss, supra note 4, at 123-25. Professor Strauss notes that, among departmentalists,
Professor Michael Stokes Paulsen presents a notable exception of a departmentalist who does
not believe that the President is legally bound to enforce courtjudgments in specific cases. Id.
149. See id. at 124 (discussing the idea that the executive as a coordinate branch, should
have symmetrical power to deny enforcement of ajudicial decision).
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Third, Professor Strauss argues that full executive autonomy is
inconsistent with the widely-accepted practice of having courts on some
occasions defer to the President and Congress on legal issues-for
example, on matters pertaining to military or foreign affairs. If the
President is always free to ignore the courts, why aren't the courts always
free to ignore the President (and Congress)?' ° The departmentalist
answer is that, unless the Constitution commits interpretative discretion to
another actor, ' the courts are formally free to exercise independent
judgment. Such independent judgment can, of course, lead to the
conclusion that the President is in a better position than the judge to
reach the right answer. In this case, the judge who is conscientiously
searching for the right answer should defer to the President's views. A
judge, however, has an obligation to defer to the constitutional views of
other actors if,but only if, those other actors are more likely than the
judge to discover the correct answer. In our now-familiar lingo,
presidential expertise on some matters may call for epistenologicaldeference
by courts but not necessarily for legal deference. Similarly, the President is
epistemologically obliged to defer to a court decision if the court's answer
is more likely to be correct than the President's answer-not because there
is a generalized legal obligation to defer to courts, but because in some
circumstances a court decision, like a staff memorandum, a law review
article, or a political tract written by Publius in 1787, can be good evidence
of the true meaning of the Constitution.
Finally, Professor Strauss insists that departmentalists cannot explain
"why the courts themselves should follow precedent." 52 If the President
should not defer to court decisions, but instead should unconditionally
search for the true meaning of the Constitution, shouldn't courts do the
same? Yet, says Professor Strauss, "no one, so far as I know, has ever said
that the Court has no obligation of any kind to follow precedent."""5
Shortly after Professor Strauss made this statement, one of' us argued
(without knowing of Professor Strauss's claim) on the basis of the same
considerations that give rise to departmentalism that, in constitutional
cases, the federal courts' practice of following the precedents of courts at
the same level of the judicial hierarchy is constitutionally suspectO- At
least one prominent departmentalist agrees with this position.
Although that earlier argument was preliminary and needs to be refined

150. See Strauss, supra note 4, at 126-27.
151. See supra notes 64-74 and accompanying text (discussing clauses that arguably confer
such discretion on other actors).
152. Strauss, supra note 4, at 127.
153. Id.
154. Gary Lawson, The Constitutional Case Against Precedent, 17 Harv.J.L. & Pub. Pol'y
23, 24-25 (1994).
155. See Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch, supra note 4, at 319 n.349 (arguing that
judges should prefer their own interpretation of the Constitution rather than rely on bad
precedent). Several others have expressed agreement, but not for attribution.
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and corrected in some important respects (a few of which are foreshadowed in this Article), we adhere to its principal thesis. If the Supreme
Court sincerely believes that one of its past decisions is wrong, after giving
due respect to the possibility that prior courts may have been more capable
of identifying the true meaning of the Constitution than the current Court,
L
the Court is constitutionally obliged to disregard the precedent.'
Professor Strauss's coherentist attack on strong departmentalism fills.
To the extent that departmentalism has the consequences attributed to it
by Professor Strauss, departmentalists should have no trouble accepting
those consequences.
Another highly sophisticated, nuanced criticism of strong departmentalism is offered by Professor Chris Eisgruber. Professor Eisgruber agrees
with much of the departmentalist critique of judicial interpretative
supremacy, 57 but insists that departmentalists often carry their critique
too far. Professor Eisgruber endorses a principle of
comparative institutional competence, pursuant to which each
institution must interpret the Constitution in order to decide how
much deference to give to specific decisions by other institutions.
Under this middle principle, no institution deserves the blind
deference of other branches, and no institution enjoys
unqualified supremacy with respect to all controversies, but,
nevertheless, each institution will sometimes owe a constitutional
duty of deference to the decisions (including erroneous decisions)
of another branch. The principle of comparative institutional
competence will permit us to justify much, though not all, of the
respect conventionally paid to judicial supremacy.'On the surface, Professor Eisgruber's approach seems similar to the
epistemological argument for deference advanced at various points in this
Article. We have argued that actors who have an obligation independently
to determine the right answer to constitutional questions will sometimes
have an obligation to defer to the decisions of others when those others
are more likely than is the actor to have found the right answer. There
may be times, in other words, when the fact that a particular person or
institution has reached a conclusion is powerful evidence, and perhaps
even the best available evidence, that the conclusion is correct. Our
epistemological principle of deference differs from Professor Eisgruber's
principle of institutional competence, however, in that Professor Eisgruber
is prepared to make a categorical judgment that, across a wide range of
constitutional questions, the federal judiciary is per se better suited to the
interpretative task than is the President or Congress. 59 Professor

156. We must leave for a later work such questions as how the distinction between legal
and epistemological deference plays out in the context of precedent and whether the lower

federal courts have different obligations with respect to Supreme Court decisions than does
the Supreme Court itself.
157. See Eisgruber, supra note 4, at 348.
158. Id. For a similar approach, see Conkle, supra note 3, at 15-16.
159. See Eisgruber, supra note 4, at 351-52 (arguing that trust in the judiciary to discern
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Eisgruber derives from this judgment about competence a constitutional
rule allocating interpretative supremacy in the general run of cases to the
judiciary." As he puts it, "[e]ach branch must interpret the Constitution
for itself (and so too must every citizen), but sometimes the best
interpretation of the Constitution will produce a bright-line rule requiring
61
respect for even erroneous decisions by other constitutional actors."1
We do not agree that the Constitution yields a bright-line rule on
deference. If the Constitution is truly supreme law, the only justification
for deference (where the Constitution does not directly command it) is
that some actor or institution is more likely to have reached the right
answer. This is necessarily a contingent inquiry, dependent not only upon
an actor's institutional role (although that can certainly be one important
factor), but also upon that actor's skill, knowledge, good faith, and
commitment to an interpretative methodology that is well suited to
reaching right answers. All judges-or presidents or congresses-are not
equally capable or reliable interpreters.
Thus, the President may freely veto legislation based on constitutional
understandings that contradict understandings implicit in prior court
judgments. As a practical matter, of course, those prior judicial
understandings may provide good information about how courts will rule
in the future, but those understandings do not legally constrain the
President's ability to sign or veto bills or Congress's ability to propose or
enact legislation over the President's veto.
2. Pardons
In discussions of presidential law interpretation, the granting of
pardons tends to be lumped together with the issuing of vetoes: everyone
seems to agree that, at least in these areas, the President is free (and
perhaps obliged) to interpret the Constitution independently of the views
of the other departments.'62 But pardons and vetoes present very
different issues in analysis. When the President considers granting a
pardon, there will ordinarily be a prior conviction under a federal criminal
statute. This means that Congress (with or without the President) must
have enacted the statute, the presidential power enforced the statute in a
prosecution, and the courts upheld the conviction, perhaps after direct

the law in other contexts justifies trust in the judiciary's constitutional interpretations given

judges' training and experience). Professor Paulsen has also noted and taken issue with this
feature of Professor Eisgruber's argument. SeePaulsen, Reply, supra note 4, at 390-91 (arguing
that the Constitution does not enumerate the task of legal interpretation on a particular
branch and requires legal interpretation to be exercised by all three branches as "incidental
to their designated powers.").
160. This allocation has important exceptions, which Professor Eisgruber discusses at
length. Se. Eisgruber, supra note 4, at 355-62.
161. Id.at 371.
162. See Easterbrook, supra note 4, at 907-09; Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch, supra
note 4, at 264-65.
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constitutional challenges. Accordingly, a pardon on constitutional grounds
challenges either the constitutionality of a statute and not merely a bill, the
constitutionality of the procedure used to secure a conviction, or both. In
the first case, the President is challenging a definitive exercise of the
legislative power, and in the second and third cases the President is at least
potentially challenging a judicial interpretation embodied in a specific
judgment. For the President to disagree with the courts following a criminal
conviction is not merely to disagree with the extension of an arguablyapplicable judicial precedent; it is to disagree with a final judicialjudgment
in a specific case.6 5
Nonetheless, the peculiar context of the pardon power dearly
generates a rule of independent review. While there are many serious legal
questions that can arise concerning the scope of the pardon power,' the
history and nature of the pardon power support the universal judgment
that there are no legal constraints on the groundsfor exercise of the power.
Accordingly, even if there was a general constitutional principle ofjudicial
supremacy, the pardon power would constitute an exception to that
principle.
3. Execution of Statutes
Most of the controversy concerning presidential constitutional
interpretation has arisen in the context of presidential nonenforcement of
statutes. Suppose that the President determines that a statute is
unconstitutional, even though Congress, the courts, and prior presidents
(or even the same president at a prior time) all determined that it was
constitutional. Must the President refuse to enforce that statute? Modern
departmentalists have uniformly answered "Yes," and they are right.
Moreover, although it is an arguable question, such presidential review
should be independent rather than Thayerian, as it must be in the context
of the presentment and pardon powers. In order to reach those
conclusions, however, one must work through the effects of two provisions
of the Constitution that do not raise issues about the President's
interpretative power in the presentment or pardon context: the
presentment power itself and the Take Care Clause.
a. The Presentment Power
The Constitution gives the President a specific role in the legislative
process. All bills must be presented to the President before they become
law. If the President vetoes the bill, it goes back to the House and Senate
for reconsideration, and it becomes a law only if is repassed by a two-thirds

163. See infra notes 223-74 and accompanying text (discussing the constitutional
significance of courtjudgments in specific cases).
164. See Edward S. Corwin, The President: Office and Powers 1787-1984, 180-90 (5th ed.
1984); Rappaport, supra note 4, at 776-79.
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majority in each house.'65
i. Vetoes and Suspension
There is a good argument that the veto is the exclusive mechanism
through which a President can express his constitutional views of
legislation. Through the presentment requirement, the Constitution goes
out of its way to specify a method by which the President's interpretation
of the Constitution can affect the legislative process. A power of
nonenforcement seems to give the President two bites at the apple.
A particular president gets two bites, however, only if he is the
president to whom the enacted bill was presented. If a past president
signed the bill into law, or if it was enacted over a presidential veto, then
nonenforcement is the President's first, not second, constitutional bite at
the law. Moreover, even if the same president who is claiming a power of
nonenforcement previously consented to the legislation, it is hard to see
why the President should not be able to change his mind. As Judge
Easterbrook has put it, "[nlo one may consent to violate the Constitution,
or bind his successor to do so."' 68
Sophisticated critics of departmentalism, however, focus not on the
"two bites" aspect of nonenforcement, but on the formal requirements and
history of the veto. They argue that the Constitution reflects a deliberate
decision to grant the President only a qualified rather than an absolute
veto.' 67 If the President vetoes a bill on constitutional grounds, Congress
is free to express its disagreement with the President's constitutional
judgment by overriding the veto. But if the President "vetoes" a law by
refusing to enforce it, Congress has no opportunity to "override" that veto.
Accordingly, it would disrupt the careful constitutional balance established
by the veto to infer a presidential power to refuse to enforce unconstitutional statutes. This argument is bolstered by the Take Care Clause, which
imposes on the President a duty to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed." The framers were obviously concerned about the ability of
presidents to kill legislation through nonenforcement, and they appear to
have flatly prohibited the practice through a constitutional requirement of
faithful execution.
Two scholars in particular have made this kind of argument with great
care and sophistication. Professor Christopher May canvassed the history of
executive nonenforcement from the English monarch's claimed royal
prerogative to suspend the laws through the debates over the veto power
during the drafting and ratification of the Constitution to assertions of
nonenforcement authority by American presidents over the past two
165. U.S. Const. art. I, § 7, d. 2.
166. Easterbrook, supra note 4, at 917.
167. Sec May, supra note 4, at 876-81 (providing a historical based analysis on a qualified
veto power).
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centuries. He convincingly demonstrates that the Constitution should be
read against the backdrop of the Glorious Revolution of 1688, in which,
inter alia, the royal prerogative of suspension was essentially rejectedle
Professor May argues that the Take Care Clause can be read as a textual
rejection by the framers of the various royal devices for avoiding executive
implementation of the laws 169 and that nothing in the history behind the
grant of "[t]he executive Power" calls this conclusion into question.'
Finally, he finds in the debates over the veto, and the rejection of an
absolute veto, strong evidence that the fi-amers did not expect the
President to be able to suspend laws once they are enacted."' He
concludes that these sources "all point to one verdict: the Constitution
does not give the President a suspending power, not even where the Chief
Executive may think that a particular law is unconstitutional."' 72
7
Erik Dyhrkopp has carried this historical analysis one step further. 5
Based on an examination of the positions taken on executive power by
each state delegation at the constitutional convention, Mr. Dyhrkopp
concludes that a majority of the states either did or clearly would have
rejected a presidential power of suspension.174 Moreover, he provides a
theoretical reason why a suspension power is inconsistent with the
Constitution's design. The structure of Congress represents a compromise
between the large and small states: the large states are for the most part
proportionally represented in the House, while the small states get equal
representation in the Senate. Because both the House and Senate must
consent to legislation, the small states are assured some measure of
protection for their interests. Through the operation of the electoral
college, however, the President was expected by the framers to be primarily
a representative of the larger states. If the President had a power of
suspension, he might be able to disregard those portions of laws that were
favorable to small states and thereby "unbundle" legislative compromises
forged by the small states through their power in the Senate. A presidential
suspension power is therefore inconsistent with the careful compromises
between the large and small states that consumed so much of the
convention's energy. 75
Professor May and Mr. Dyhrkopp have perhaps irrefutably
demonstrated that there is no good textual, structural, or historical case for

168. See id. at 869-73 (describing the historical circumstances surrounding the English
crown during the fourteenth to seventeenth century which vitiated the king's suspending
power).
169. Id. at 87-74.
170. Id. at 881-85.
171. Id. at 87 6-81;.see also id. at 885-89 (noting the lack of evidence in the debates over the
Bill of Rights that indicates any awareness that the President might have a suspension power).
172. May, supra note 4,at 894.
173. Erik F. Dyhrkopp, Executive Nonenforcement and the Philadelphia Convention (June
1990) (manuscript on file with Iowa Law Review).
174. Id. at 22-27, 45-50.
175. Id. at 27-45.
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a general presidential power to revise or refuse to enforce enacted laws.
The Constitution's text (the Take Care Clause), structure (the presentment
process and the bicameral legislature), and history (the Glorious
Revolution and the views on executive power expressed during the
ratification debates) all point to constraints on the, power of the President
to suspend the operation of laws with which he disagrees.'7 6
As Professor May recognizes, however, the existence vel non of a
general power of suspension is not the issue. 7 We are not aware of any
serious scholar who has argued that die President has complete power to
disregard enacted laws-no more than anyone has argued that federal
courts, in the exercise of their 'Judicial Power" to resolve disputes in
accordance with governing law, can simply choose to ignore applicable
federal statutes with which they disagree. The issue, rather, is whether the
President has the power or duty to refuse to give effect to unconstitutional
laws. As we have seen, the same considerations that give rise to a power of
judicial review-a power and obligation to disregard unconstitutional laws
in the exercise of the judiciary's constitutional functions-also give rise to
a power of presidential review.178 The existence and structure of the
presentment power, alone or in combination with the Take Care Clause,
does not overcome the prima facie case for presidential review.
Nor does a power of presidential review render the veto superfluous.
A pouer of nonenforcement of unconstitutional laws and the veto power
have different spheres of application and are subject to different
constraints.
First, a power of presidential review does not entitle the President to
disregard laws simply because he thinks they are bad policy; the power
extends only to laws the President deems unconstitutional. The veto, by
contrast, can be exercised for any reason at all.
Second, a veto, unless overridden, prevents a bill from becoming a
law. A refusal to enforce, however, leaves the statute on the books--just as
judicial review is not a power to erase statutes from the United States Code
but simply a power to refuse to give them effect in specific cases. Professor
May notes and discounts this difference between the veto and a
nonenforcement power, 76 but he does not acknowledge its real
significance. The potential consequences of a veto of a bill and a refusal to
enforce an enacted law are very different. Congress's ability to override a
presidential veto is not the only formal mechanism by which Congress can
disagree with the President's constitutional judgments. The Constitution
grants to Congress another very important, although often overlooked,
power: the power of impeachment.

176. We do not attempt to draw the line between impermissible refusals to enforce and

permissible exercises of prosecutorial discretion.
177. SeeMay, supra note 4, at 1011 n.32.
178. See infra notes 263-68 and accompanying

text (summarizing
arguments favoring a presidential power ofjudicial review).
179. See May, supra note 4, at 877 n.48.

Professor Paulsen's
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ii. Nonenforcement and Impeachment
The Constitution takes the impeachment process very seriously. No

fewer than six provisions of the Constitution deal with impeachment, and
they set out the impeachment process in some detail: the House is given
"the sole Power of Impeachment";"80 the Senate is given "the sole Power
to try all Impeachments, " 181 which it must exercise under oath;"1 2 a twothirds majority of the Senate is required for conviction; 8 " the sole
consequence of conviction is removal from office and disqualification from
holding further offices (although conviction does not preclude prosecution
under criminal laws);'" all civil officers, including the President and Vice
President, are subject to removal upon impeachment for and conviction of
"Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors";as the
President's pardon power does not extend to impeachments; 6 the Chief
Justice shall preside over impeachment trials in the Senate when the
President is tried;"' and trial by jury does not extend to impeachment' Impeachment is obviously an important part of the structural
Constitution.
The President, like other civil officers, can be impeached and
removed for "Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors."
The Constitution does not define the key phrase "high Crimes and
Misdemeanors, " '89 and we do not intend to provide a comprehensive
discussion of the phrase's meaning.'9 It is enough for bur purposes to
establish some broad outlines of the scope of the impeachment power.
The evidence is overwhelming that "high Crimes and Misdemeanors"
need not be offenses that are indictable as ordinary crimes. Indeed, we
know of no modem scholar of impeachment who believes that
9
impeachment and removal must be predicated on an indictable crime.'O
180. U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, d. 5.
181. Id. art I, § 3, cl. 6.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. art. I, § 3, cL 7.
185. U.S. Const. art. II, § 4.
186. Id. art. H, § 2, cl. 1.
187. Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
188. Id. art III,§ 2, cl. 3.
189. Id. art. U1,§ 4. The Constitution specifies that "Treason against the United States,
shall consist only in levying War against them, or, in adhering to the Enemies, giving them
Aid and Comfort." Id. art. I, § 3, di. 1. Bribery presumably has its traditional meaning.
190. For some excellent studies of the meaning of "high Crimes and Misdemeanors," that
all reach essentially the same condusions, see Raoul Berger, Impeachment: The Constitutional
Problems 53-103 (1973); Charles L Black, Jr., Impeachment: A Handbook 27-41 (1974);
Michael J. Gerhardt, The Constitutional Limits to Impeachment and Its Alternatives, 68 Tex.
L. Rev. 1, 82-89 (1989); Ronald D. Rotunda, An Essay on the Constitutional Parameters of
Federal Impeachment, 76 Ky. UJ. 707, 721-28 (1987-88).
191. See, e.g., Berger, supra note 190, at 62-67, 73-78; Black, supra note 190, at 37-41;John
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Rather, a "high" offense is an offense, whether or not technically criminal,
committed by a public official against the interest or dignity of the state. As
Hamilton explained in The Federalist, impeachment concerns "those
offenses which proceed from the misconduct of public men, or, in other
words, from the abuse or violation of some public trust. They are of a
nature which may with peculiar propriety be denominated politica4 as they
relate chiefly to injuries done immediately to the society itself." Iss Such
offenses might, of course, also constitute indictable crimes, but there is no
affirmative requirement that such offenses be independently criminal.
On the other hand, it seems unlikely that then-Representative Gerald
Ford was correct in 1970 when, in the context of pending impeachment
proceedings against Justice William 0. Douglas, he declared that "an
impeachable offense is whatever a majority of the House of Representatives
considers it to be at a given moment in history; conviction results from
whatever offense or offenses the [Senate] considers to be sufficiently
serious to require removal of the accused from office."1 93 Whether or not
impeachment decisions are subject to judicial review,'" the Constitution
specifies criteria for impeachment that the House and Senate are obliged
to discover and follow. Impeachment and removal can occur only for
"Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors," not for
"Treason, Bribery, or such other acts as Congress may deem to be high
Crimes and Misdemeanors."
Important guidance on the meaning of "high Grimes and
Misdemeanors" can be found in English history and in the debates
concerning the drafting and ratification of the Constitution. 95 According
to William Blackstone, a high misdemeanor in eighteenth-century English
usage included "mal-administration of such high officers, as are in public
trust and employment."5 5 And although impeachment proceedings often
R. Labovitz, Presidential Impeachment 126 (1978); Gerhardt, supra note 190, at 82; Rotunda,
supra note 190, at 721-25. But see Labovitz, supra, at 93-100 (describing debates during
President Nixon's impeachment proceedings on whether impeachment requires an indictable
crime).
192. The Federalist No. 65, at 396 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
Hamilton's views on this subject were fully representative of the thinking of the founding
generation. For a thorough discussion, see Rotunda, supra note 190, at 721-25.
193. 116 Cong. Rec. 11,913 (1970).
194. We take no view on this question. See Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 228-38
(1993) (holding nonjusticiable a challenge to trial before a Senate committee rather than the
full Senate); Berger, supra note 190, at 103-21 (urging judicial review of impeachment
decisions); Michael J. Gerhardt, Rediscovering Nonjusticiability. Judicial Review of
Impeachments after Arixon, 44 Duke L.J. 231, 253 (1994) (defending a broad conception of
nonjusticiability for impeachments).
195. Needless to say, we emphasize only a few highlights from these materials. For an
exhaustive discussion of the English history of impeachment, see Berger, supra note 190, at
53-103; and for an illuminating discussion of the convention and ratification debates, see
Rotunda, supra note 190, at 722-25.
196. 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Law of England 121 (1757) quoted in
Berger, supra note 190, at 62.
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involved charges of corruption, some pre-eighteenth-century English
impeachments concerned such matters as abuse of official power or
neglect of duty19
George Mason invoked something akin to Blackstone's conception of
an impeachable offense during the drafting of the impeachment provisions
at the Constitutional Convention. Until September 8, 1787, just nine days
before the Constitution was completed, the only stated grounds in the
Constitution for impeachment were treason and bribery. Mason, James
Madison, and Gouverneur Morris then engaged in a brief colloquy
Col. Mason. Why is the provision restrained to Treason &
bribery only? Treason as defined in the Constitution will not
reach many great and dangerous offenses .... Attempts to
stbvert the Constitution may not be Treason as above
defined ....He movd. to add after "bribery" "or maladministration" ....
Mr. Madison. So vague a term will be equivalent to a tenure
during pleasure of the Senate.
Mr. Govr Morris, it will not be put in force & can do no
harm-An election of every four years will prevent maladministration.
Col. Mason withdrew "maladministration" & substitutes
"other high crimes & misdemeanors" [agst. the State"]. "
Note that Madison's objection to the term "maladministration" was
directed to its vagueness, not to its extension of the range of impeachable
offenses beyond treason and bribery to include, in particular, "[a]ttempts
to subvert the Constitution." Comments during the ratification debates
confirm that the original understanding of the phrase "high Crimes and
Misdemeanors" permitted impeachment and removal of a President if he
"deviates from his duty" 99 or "dare[s] to abuse the powers vested in him
by the people." 2 w On the other hand, the concern that the President not
be reduced to serving at the pleasure of the Congress indicates that mere
congressional disagreements with the President's policies do not rise to the
level of "high Crimes and Misdemeanors."
Impeachment is thus not a meaningful check on the President's veto
power. The Constitution contains no legal constraints on the President's
veto power; the President can veto a bill for any reason. Accordingly,
absent extraordinary circumstances, it would be an unconstitutional abuse
of the impeachment process for Congress to impeach and remove the

197. See Berger, supra note 190, at 67-71.
198. 2 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 550 (Max Farrand ed., 1911). The
substitution was accepted by an 8-3 vote.
199. See 4 Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal
Constitution 47 (Jonathan Elliott ed., 2d ed. 1836) (discussing the statement of Archibald
MacLaine at the North Carolina convention).
200. See 2 Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal
Constitution 169 (discussing the statement of Samuel Stillman at the Massachusetts
convention).
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President for exercising the veto power in a particular way; for example, by
vetoing a20 bill on constitutional grounds with which Congress strongly
disagrees. '
The situation is very different when the President refuses to enforce a
law on the ground that it is unconstitutional. The President has a
constitutional obligation to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed."202 Nonenforcement by definition extends beyond the ordinary
executive prerogative of prosecutorial discretion and constitutes a
deliberate, unfaithful failure to execute. Such action, if' sufficiently
serious,2 s seems to fall squarely within the scope of abuses that are
encompassed by the original meaning of the phrase "high Crimes and
Misdemeanors": "Attempts to subvert the Constitution" and "[deviations]
from his duty." Accordingly, if the President refuses to enforce a law
because his judgment is that the law is unconstitutional, the President
generates the very real possibility that Congress could express its own,
contrary constitutional judgment through an impeachment proceeding.2
Is it possible, however, that a President's good-faith belief that a law is
unconstitutional-a good-faith exercise of the constitutionally-granted
executive power of presidential review--can form the basis for an
impeachment proceeding? Certainly it can. Until very recently, good faith
was not a defense available to executive officials in private damages actions.
At the time of the founding, even military officials who acted on the direct
instructions of the President in matters involving foreign affairs could be
liable in damages if their actions were in fact unlawful and interfered with
private rights.' Although modem law confers on the President absolute
immunity from damages actions arising out of his official acts as
President,0 8 the founding generation was much more willing than we are
201. We say "absent extraordinary circumstances" in order to accommodate the possibility
that use of the veto could rise to a level of presidential irresponsibility suffident to warrant
impeachment. Charles Black suggests that impeachment can similarly check, in extraordinary
circumstances, use of the President's legally-unlimited pardon power.
Suppose a president were to announce and follow a policy of granting full pardons,
in advance of indictment or trial, to all federal agents or police who killed anybody
in line of duty, in the District of Columbia, whatever the circumstances and however
unnecessary the killing. This would not be a crime, and probably could not be made
a crime under the Constitution. But could anybody doubt that such conduct would
be impeachable?
Black, supra note 190, at 34.

202. U.S. Const. art. I, § 3.
203. A number of scholars read the historical materials to suggest some threshold of
Black, supra
concrete harm to the Republic before impeachment is legally warranted. See, g.,
note 190, at 37; Labovitz, supra note 191, at 127. It is possible to argue, of course, that every
refusal to enforce a congressional statute is "serious" enough to constitute potential grounds
for impeachment.
204. See Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch, supra note 4, at 322-23.
205. SeeLittle v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 179 (1804) (holding that commanders of
vessels who seized American vessels coming from French parts were liable for damages even
though they were following presidential orders).
206. See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 757-58 (1982). We express no view on whether
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to make government officials bear the consequences of their innocent
mistakes. The President is constitutionally free to express and act upon his
judgment regarding the constitutionality of enacted legislation,
and
7
Congress is constitutionally free to express its contrary judgment
The specter of Congress routinely attempting to impeach the
President for failure to enforce the laws may suggest to some that
presidential review should at least be Thayerian rather than independent,
reserved for cases in which the President not only believes that a statute is
unconstitutional, but believes it with a very high degree of confidence.
After all, if the President believes that the conditions for presidential
review are satisfied, he has both the power and the duty to refuse to
enforce the unconstitutional law.208 The President cannot shirk that duty
simply out of fear of impeachment-no more than he can shirk it out of
fear of losing the next election. Could the framers possibly have
contemplated this kind of ongoing constitutional brinksmanship?
We discuss briefly in Part III why the answer to this question must be
"Yes." For the moment, we simply note that if the structure of the
impeachment process is enough to overcome the prima facie case for
presidential review, or at least for independent presidential review, it must
similarly overcome the prima facie case for judicial, or at least for
independent judicial, review. Judges as well as the President are "civil
Officers" subject to impeachment; their constitutionally-guaranteed tenure
"during good Behaviour" does not prevent their removal for "high Crimes
and Misdemeanors." The grant to federal judges of "[t]he judicial Power"
confers on them the duty to decide cases or controversies within their
jurisdiction in accordance with governing law. A failure to decide cases in
accordance with law amounts to a breach of this constitutional duty.
Accordingly, a judge who decides cases based on a coin toss, the race or

Fitzgerald was correctly decided.
207. It is important to bear in mind that, in the scenario under discussion, the President is
not being impeached for incorrectly interpreting the Constitution. Rather, the President is
being impeached for failing to carry out his constitutionally-prescribed duty to "take Care that
the Laws be faithfully executed." U.S. Const art. 1, § 3. The President's reason for refusing to
enforce the law in question-his belief that the law in question is unconsttutional-does not
alter the act of nonenforcement itself. If the President is objectively correct that the law in
question is unconstitutional, then the President's action is justified and Congress would be
wrong to impeach and convict him even though it has the power to do so. If, however, the
President's constitutional judgment is objectively wrong, then impeachment and removal
could be appropriate. The question is whether the President or Congress acting in its capacity
as an impeachment tribunal (or, conceivably, the Supreme Court) has the legally-binding final
word on the correctness of the President's interpretation.
208. The nonenforcement power thus differs in this respect from the pardon power. The
pardon power is discretionary the President need not exercise the pardon power in every case
of conviction under an unconstitutional statute. See Rappaport, supra note 4, at 777-79
(providing a detailed analysis of how a presidential pardon is a privilege and not a right and
justifying why it is discretionary). Similarly, the impeachment power is discretionary. Congress
is not constitutionally obliged to exercise its impeachment power whenever it believes that the
constitutional bases for impeachment have been satisfied.
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religion of the parties, or some other arbitrary basis, would dearly be
subject to impeachment and removal. Similarly, ajudge who refuses to give
effect to-refuses to enforce-a congressional statute on the ground that
the statute is bad public policy would be subject to impeachment for
deviation from duty and abuse of office. Nothing changes analytically if a
judge refuses to give effect to a statute on the ground that it is
unconstitutional. The exercise of the power ofjudicial review, no less than
the exercise of the power of presidential review, presents a potential
occasion for Congress to express its constitutional disagreement with
another department through the impeachment process. 2 9 If the threat of
impeachment is enough to require Thayerian deference on the part of the
President when challenging the constitutionality of enacted laws, it should
also be enough to require Thayerian deference by federal judges.
In sum, the existence of the veto power is not inconsistent with a
power of independent presidential review. The two powers have different
functions
and different consequences. They may, and do, peacefully
210
coexist.

b. The Take Care Clause
The Presentment Clause is not the only clause of the Constitution that
potentially bears on the President's power of interpretation with respect to
enacted statutes. One must also consider the implications of the
constitutional requirement that the President "take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed."2
We have already seen that the Take Care Clause does not exclude a
power of presidential review. 212 The President must "take Care that the

209. Objections to this conclusion on the ground that it violates 'Judicial independence"
beg the question. Judges are clearly "independent" in one important constitutional sense: they
have tenure "during good Behaviour." U.S. Const. art. MI, § 1. Accordingly, judges are not
subject to at-will removal by the President and Congress cannot give them limited terms of
office. They are also "independent" in the sense that they are not legally bound to give
deference to the constitutional views of Congress or the President. Judges are, however,
subject to removal through impeachment, and we see no escape from the conclusion that
Congress has the power to impeach and remove judges who do not, in the ultimate judgment
of Congress, decide cases in accordance with governing law.
We leave for another time the interesting question whether "bad"judicial decisions
must generate some threshold of harm to the nation before they can be sufficient grounds for
impeachment. We also leave for another day the question whether a congressional
determination that a particular brand ofjudicial decisionmaking constitutes a "high Crime[]"
or "Misdemeanor" is subject to judidal review.
210. A second, related argument against presidential review based on the veto power
maintains that a nonenforcement power functions much like a line-item veto, for which the
Constitution does not provide. As Professor Rappaport has pointed out, however, nonenforcement functions very differently from a line-item veto, Rappaport, supra note 4, at 770-71,just
as nonenforcement functions differently from, and has different consequences than, a true
constitutional veto.
211. U.S. Const. art. II, § 3.
212. See supra notes 81-90 and accompanying text (discussing the President's executive
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Laws be faithfully executed," but that is not a requirement or a license to
ignore the Constitution-no more than is thejudiciary's power and duty to
decide cases in accordance with applicable statutes. But one must still ask
whether the Take Care Clause affects the standard of review that the
President should apply when exercising the power of presidential
review. '3 As Professor David Strauss elegantly stated:
[I]t is... theoretically possible that the Take Care Clause,
properly interpreted, requires the President to comply with all
acts of Congress that are not utterly indefensible. Or it is possible
(indeed, quite likely) that the Take Care Clause, properly
understood, requires some lesser, but still substantial, degree of
deference to the constitutional judgments implicit in Congress's
decision to enact a law.214
The Take Care Clause, in other words, could be read to require that
executive review be to some degree Thayerian rather than independent.
There is remarkably little evidence about the meaning of the Take
Care Clause.1 We can be confident, however, of two points. First, the
Take Care Clause is not a grant of power to the President; it is a limitation
on the President's power.216 The dause is worded as a duty: the President
"shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed." The Take Care
Clause is thus best read to limit the grant of "[t]he executive Power" to the
President. Second, Professor May and the scholars on whom he relies2 7
are surely correct that the most important, if not the sole, aspect of this
limitation is to make dear that "[t]he executive Power" does not include a
power analogous to a royal prerogative of suspension.
None of this, however, tells us much about presidential review.
Accordingly, we must resort to first principles, which establish a prima fade
case for independent presidential review. Perhaps there are reasons why
presidential review of statutes should generally be Thayerian. But the Take
Care Clause, which seems narrowly targeted at the dreaded royal
suspension power, appears to be a neutral player in that dispute.
4. Execution of CourtJudgments
218
With the notable exception of Professor Michael Stokes Paulsen,
every modem departmentalist scholar has maintained that the President
has an obligation to enforce specific judgments rendered by federal
power).
213. See Strauss, supra note 4, at 117 ("[Alnswering the question about executive
autonomy does not automatically answer the question about the Take Care Clause.").
214. Id. at 118.
215. See Labovitz, supra note 191, at 133-34.
216. See Lawson, supra note 67, at 1242 (noting that the Take Care Clause limits
presidential power to execute laws).
217. See, ag., Robert J. Reinstein, An Early View of Executive Powers and Privilege: The
Trial of Smith and Ogden, 2 Hastings. Const. L.Q. 309, 320-21 (1975).
218. See Paulsen, The Meryman Power, supra note 4, at 81; Paulsen, The Most Dangerous
Branch, supra note 4, at 212.
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even when the President believes that the judgments rest on

erroneous constitutional reasoning. These scholars, who have included one
of this Article's authors, have insisted that "[t]hejudicial Power" means the
power to decide cases with finality, so that judgments must by their nature
bind the executive (and Congress) to enforcement.22 Professor Paulsen
and Professor Strauss have both correctly noted that this claim has never
been defended in a convincing fashionY1 No one as yet seems to have
determined whether the original meaning of "[t]he judicial Power"
contains a specific conception of the finality of judgments.2 We take up
that issue here. Although the question is not free from doubt, we conclude
that the President ordinarily must comply with judgments rendered in
specific cases by federal courts. In some limited circumstances, however,
the power of presidential review can extend to judgments rendered in
specific cases by federal courts, although such presidential review must be
strongly Thayerian.

a. The Executive Power and the Enforcement ofJudgments
The "executive Power" vested in the President includes the power to
carry into execution federal statutes and federal court judgments. This
power, however, is hemmed in by certain duties. The Take Care Clause, by

specifying that the President "shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed," makes clear that the President does not have a general power to
suspend the operation of statutes.m It seems clear that the Take Care

219. By "judgments" we mean the concrete dispositions of cases, including where
applicable the prescription of a remedy (or imposition of a sentence). The judgmen---the
disposition of the case-must be distinguished from the opinion (if any)-the court's
explanation for its judgment.
220. See, &g., Easterbrook, supra note 4, at 926; Engdahl, John Marshall's "Jeffersonian"
Concept, supra note 4, at 312; Harrison, supra note 135, at 372; Lawson, supra note 154, at
30.
221. See Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch, supra note 4, at 294-98; Strauss, supra note
4, at 124. Professor Strauss concludes from this that departmentalists are not, and cannot be,
really serious about departmentalism, id. at 124-25, while Professor Paulsen concludes that the
President has np legally binding obligation to enforce judgments, Paulsen, The Most
Dangerous Branch, supra note 4, at 343-45.
222. This failure may be a function of curricular specialization in the legal academy.
Although the nature of courtjudgments has important ramifications for constitutional theory,
the subject ofjudgments and their finality is normally the province of texts and treatises on
civil procedure. See, e.g., FlemingJames, Jr., Civil Procedure §§ 11.1-11.35, at 517-603 (1965);
Richard L Marcus et al., Civil Procedure: A Modem Approach 947-1024 (1939). Accordingly,
constitutional commentators do not ordinarily grapple with the implications of the original
understanding ofjudicial finality for constitutional theory. For a rare exception, see Engdahl,
John Marshall's "Jeffersonian" Concept, supra note 4, at 312-1 .
On the other hand, it may simply be a function of the dearth of materials. The debates
surrounding the drafting and ratification of the Constitution say remarkabl little about the
content of "[t]
he judicial Power."
223. See supra notes 215-17 and accompanying text (discussing limits on presidential power
to execute law).

THE EXECUTIVE POWER OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 1315
Clause, by its terms, applies only to statutes and not to court decisions.
Although there is a good linguistic argument for regarding court
judgments as laws,2 4 in almost every other place where the Constitution
speaks of "law" or "the laws," it dearly means "statutes."2
Nonetheless, it seems dear that the President does not have a general
power to suspend the execution of courtjudgments. The fact that the Take
Care Clause refers only to an obligation to enforce statutes is not
dispositive of this question. There was, at the time of the founding, a very
real historical danger of presidents claiming a power to suspend the
operation of statutes. The framers had to consider the example of the
English monarchs and the declaration of John Locke that the executive
power included a prerogative "to act according to discretion, for the
publick good, without the prescription of the Law, and sometimes even

224. Samuel Johnson's Dictionary includes among its definitions of a law, "a decree, edict,
statute, or custom, publickly established as a rule of justice," "a decree authoritatively
annexing rewards or punishments to certain actions," and "Judicial process." Johnson, supra
note 84. A "decree," in turn, is defined in part as "A determination of a suit, or litigated
cause." Id.
225. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (stating that a census shall take place in such manner
as Congress "shall by Law direct"); id. art. I, § 4, d. 1 (Congress may "by Law" change the
time, place, and manner of holding election to the House); id. art. 1, § 4, cl. 2 (sessions of
Congress shall begin on a constitutionally specified date unless Congress "shall by Law" specify
a different date); id. art. I, § 6, cl. 1 (the pay of members of Congress is to be "ascertained by
Law"); id. art. I, § 7, ci. 2 (specifying the procedure whereby a bill becomes "a Law"); art. I,
§ 8, ci. 15 (Congress has power to call the militia "to execute the Laws of the Union"); id.
art. I, § 8, c. 18 (Congress can make "all Laws" which are necessary and proper for carrying
into execution federal powers); id. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 (no "ex post facto Law shall be passed" by
Congress); id. art. I, § 9, d. 7 (treasury funds can be withdrawn only "in Consequence of
Appropriations made by Law"); id. art. I, § 10, cl. I (no state shall pass any "ex post facto Law,
or Law impairing the obligation of contracts"); id. art. I, § 10, ci. 2 (states can levy imposts or
duties only if they are necessary for executing "inspection Laws," and "all such Laws" are
subject to congressional control); id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (federal offices may be "established by
Law," and Congress may "by Law" allow inferior officers to be appointed by the President or
other officers without Senate confirmation"); id. art. III, § 2, c. 1 (the judicial power shall
extend to all Cases arising under "the Laws of the United States"); id. art. IV, § 1 (Congress
may "by general Laws" implement the Full Faith and Credit Clause); id. art. VI, cl. 2 (the
Constitution "and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof'
are the supreme law of the land); cf.id. art. I, § 8, cl. 10 (mentioning "the Law of Nations");
id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (referring to "the Courts of Law"); id. art. III, § 2, ci. I (distinguishing
between "Law and Equity"); id. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 (distinguishing between "Law and Fact").
There may be two exceptions. First, the Constitution specifies that the penalty for
impeachment is removal from and disqualification for federal office, but that conviction does
not prevent further criminal prosecution and punishment "according to Law." Id. art. 1, § 3,
ci. 7. If all crimes must be statutory, then this is a clear reference to statutory "Law." If,
however, there can be a federal common law of crimes, one can argue that this reference
includes judicial decisions. For a spirited defense of a federal common law of crimes, see
Stephen B. Presser, The Original Misunderstanding 67-99 (1991). Second, the Fugitive Slave
Clause dealt with persons "held to Service of Labour in one State, under the Laws thereof'
who are purportedly discharged from slavery "in Consequence of any Law or Regulation" of
another state. Id. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3. One can imagine an argument that slavery, or its abolition,
is a product of the common law rather than statute.
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against it.... ,,26 In all likelihood, no one thought it necessary to
include a specific prohibition on suspension of courtjudgments. Moreover,
the available evidence points strongly away from a presidential power to
suspend or revise judicial judgments.
Justice Scalia, writing for a majority of the Court, recently canvassed
the historical materials concerning legislative revision or reopening of final
judgments. He concluded that
The record of history shows that the Framers crafted this charter
of the judicial department with an expressed understanding that
it gives the Federal Judiciary the power, not merely to rule on
cases, but to decide them, subject to review only by superior courts
in the Article III hierarchy-with an understanding, in short, that
"a judgment conclusively resolves the case" because "a judicial
Power' is one to render dispositive judgments." 2
A brief look at a few of the sources from the historical record confirms
Justice Scalia's conclusions.
The issue of judicial finality arose in Hayburn's Casaw A 1792
statute allowed war veterans seeking pensions to file claims with a circuit
court, which would make findings of eligibility and certify those findings to
the Secretary at War.2 In any given case, the Secretary could either
accept the court's findings and place the applicant's name on the list of
pensioners or could refuse to place the applicant on the list if the
Secretary had "cause to suspect imposition or mistake. " 23' Three circuit
courts-two of them in the context of specific applications-indicated that
they regarded the law as unconstitutional because it subjected their
decisions to revision or suspension by the executive. The Pennsylvania
circuit court that received William Hayburn's application, which included
Supreme CourtJustices Wilson and Blair, explained in a letter to President
Washington that the federal courts were vested only with judicial power
and that the judicial power, by its nature, must be final as against the
legislature and executive.3 2 The Court declared:
Upon due consideration, we have been unanimously of
opinion, that, under this act, the Circuit court held for the
Pennsylvania district could not proceed;
1st. Because the business directed by this act is not of a
judicial nature. It forms no part of the power vested by the
Constitution in the courts of the United States; the Circuit court
must, consequently, have proceeded without constitutional
226. Locke, supra note 80, § 160.
227. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1447, 1452-63 (1995). We confine our
discussion, as did Justice Scalia, to judgments that are no longer subject to appeal within the
federal judicial hierarchy.
228. Id. at 1453 (quoting Easterbrook, supra note 4, at 926).
229. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792).
230. Act of Mar. 23, 1792, ch. 11, § 2, 1 Stat. 243, 244.
231. Id. § 4, 1 Stat, at 244.
232. See Haybum's Case 2 U.S. (2. Dal.) at 411 n.*.
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authority.
2d. Because, if, upon that business, the court had proceeded,
its judgments (for its opinions are its judgments) might, under the
same act, have been revised and controuled by the legislature,
and by an officer in the executive department. Such revision and
controul we deemed radically inconsistent with the independence
of that judicial power which is vested in the courts; and,
consequently, with that important principle which
is so strictly
5
observed by the Constitution of the United States.0
The New York circuit court, which included Justices Jay and Gushing, had
earlier reached the same conclusion concerning executive (and legislative)
review of court judgments, explaining:
That neither the legislative nor the executive branches, can
constitutionally assign to the judicial any duties, but such as are
properlyjudicial, and to be performed in ajudicial manner.
That the duties assigned to the circuit, by this act, are not of
that description, and that the act itself does not appear to
contemplate them as such; in as much as it subjects the decisions
of these courts, made pursuant to those duties, first to the
consideration and suspension of the secretary at war, and then to
the revision of the legislature; whereas by the constitution, neither
the secretary at war, nor any other executive officer, nor even the
legislature, are authorized to sit as a court of errors on the
judicial acts or opinions of this court. m
The North Carolina circuit court, which included Justice Iredell, similarly
said in a letter to President Washington:
That whatever doubt may be suggested, whether the power
in question is properly of a judicial nature, yet inasmuch as the
decision of the court is not made final, but may be at least
suspended in its operation by the secretary at war, if he shall have
cause to suspect imposition or mistake; this subjects the decision
of the court to a mode of revision which we consider to be
unwarranted by the constitution; for though congress may
certainly establish, in instances not yet provided for, courts of
appellate jurisdiction, yet such courts must consist of judges
appointed in the manner the constitution requires, and holding
their offices by no other tenure than that of their good
behavior, by which tenure the office of secretary at war is not
held. And we beg leave to add, with all due deference, that no
decision of any court of the United States can, under any
circumstances, in our opinion, agreeable to the constitution, be
liable to a revision, or even suspension, by the legislature itself, in
whom no judicial power of any kind appears to be vested, but the
important one relative to impeachments.2"
One can persuasively argue, of course, that Congress and the President

233.
234.
235.

Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 410 n.(a) (emphasis added).
Id. at 413 n.*.
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expressed very different constitutional judgments by enacting the law in
question, and that one cannot draw significant conclusions from the selfinterested pronouncements of the judiciary. In 1793, however, Congress
changed the procedures for pension applications, which mooted the
constitutional problem seen by the courts.2 Accordingly, it is possible
that upon mature consideration of the matter, all three departments
agreed in 1793 that it was improper to allow the legislative or executive
departments to revise or suspend judicial judgments.
Hamilton similarly argued against a congressional suspension power
in The Federalist,when he wrote that "[a] legislature, without exceeding its
province, cannot reverse a determination once made in a particular case;
though it may prescribe a new rule for future cases."2 7 The judges in
Calderv. Bulls in 1798 adopted the same view of the nature of legislative
power. The Connecticut legislature had passed a statute setting aside a
state court's testamentary decree and ordering a new trial. The judges
acknowledged that Connecticut's constitution-which at that time was still
its colonial charter of 1662-evidently permitted this practice.2" The
judges indicated, however, that this legislative power of revision flew in the
face of then-contemporary understandings of the statt; of judicial
judgments. Justice Paterson indicated that "dthe awarding of new trials falls
properly within the province of the judiciary," 24° and Justice Iredell
agreed.4
These sources all focus on attempts by the legislature to suspend or
revise judicial judgments, but the principles they contain apply equally well
to executive suspension and revision. One can fairly conclude that, under
the constitutional separation of powers, neither the President nor Congress
has a general power to revise or suspend judicial judgments. Notwithstanding the limited scope of the Take Care Clause, the President must ensure
that federal court judgments are faithfully executed.
But just as the Take Care Clause does not settle the question whether
the President must execute statutes that he regards as unconstitutional, the
implicit take-care requirement for judgments that stems from the Article II
and Article III Vesting Clauses does not settle the question whether the
236.

See Act of Feb. 29, 1793, ch. 17, 1 Stat. 3241 (regulating the claims to invalid

pensions).
237. The Federalist No. 81, at 484 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
238. 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 385 (1798).
239. See id. at 395 (opinion of Paterson, J.); id. at 398 (opinion of Iredell, J.).
240. Id. at 395 (opinion of Paterson, J.). Justice Paterson's use of the word "properly" is
especially noteworthy, as the term was commonly used in the founding generation to describe
jurisdictional lines between governmental departments. See Lawson & Granger, supra note 11,
at 291-97 (discussing the context in which "properly" was often used during the founding

era).
241. See Calde, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 398 (opinion of Iredell, J.) ("It may, indeed, appear
strange... that.., there should exist a power to grant... new rights of trial .... The
power... isjudicial in its nature; and whenever it is exercised... it is an exercise ofjudicial,
not of legislative, authority.").
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President must execute court judgments that rest on what the President
regards as erroneous interpretations of the Constitution. In order to
overcome the prima fade case for independent presidential review, one
must find in the grant of "[the judicial Power" an even stronger
conception of the finality of judgments that establishes a presidential duty
of execution.
We think that such a conception of the finality of judgments can be
found, although it generates a weaker presidential duty of obedience than
is commonly supposed. The best way to illustrate the considerations that
lead us to find an affirmative but less-than-absolute presidential duty to
enforce court judgments is to present, in point-counterpoint fashion, the
best arguments we can muster in favor of two polar positions: that the
President has an absolute duty to enforce court judgments and that the
President has no legally binding duty to enforce judgments that he
conscientiously believes rest on constitutional error. We structure these
arguments like briefs and do not mean at this juncture to take sides. After
setting forth the various arguments for each polar position, we then
evaluate the competing considerations and reach a conclusion.
b. Point: The Casefor Absolute JudicialFinality
One possible answer to the problem of presidential review of court
judgments is to say that "[t]he judicial Power" by its nature is the power to
resolve disputes with absolute finality, so that a judgment that is no longer
subject to appeal within the judicial system is, with respect to the legislative
and executive departments, final by definition. The President, on this view,
has an absolute obligation to obey and enforce judgments issued by the
federal courts. This view is so much taken for granted in our legal culture
that we are aware of no sustained argument in favor of it. A sophisticated
proponent of this position, however, would likely invoke the following
considerations.
First, the available historical materials, as surveyed above, at least
suggest that judgments are absolutely binding. Whatever may have been
242
the traditional rule of finality within the judicial department, judgments
have always been thought of as final between the judicial department and
the political departments. Moreover, none of the available materials on
judicial finality suggest an exception for judgments based on constitutional
errors. Finality means finality.
Second, there is a long tradition of presidential obedience to court
judgments. The only dear example of presidential defiance of a court
judgment is Ex parte Men mans24 decided during a time of national crisis.

242. See infra notes 249-62 and accompanying text (discussing how the finality ofjudicial
judgments may not be absolute).
243. 17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9487). The State of Georgia effectively defied
the Supreme Court'sjudgment in Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832), that the
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This too suggests that judgments have long been understood to be
absolutely binding on the executive department. Moreover, if the President
in fact has the power to refuse to enforce unconstitutional judgments, he
also has the duty to refuse to enforce them-just as judges have both the
power and the duty to refuse to give effect to unconstitutional statutes.
Unless the courts are considerably less fallible than common sense would
suggest, there have been numerous occasions for the exercise of
presidential review. The dearth of examples of presidential review of
judgments indicates that no such presidential power has ever existed.
Third, the principle of coordinacy, 244 which helps give rise to the
inference of a power of presidential review, may also serve to limit that
power. The federal judiciary is a coordinate department of the national
government. If judgments of the courts are not legally binding on the
legislative and executive departments, it is hard to understand in what
sense the judiciary could be coordinate. If the President is free to
disregard courtjudgments, then the judiciary is reduced to issuing advisory
opinions, which may or may not have the force of law, depending on the
determinations of the executive department. As both Haybum's Case24
and the Correspondence of the Justices24 6 illustrate, founding-era understandings of "[t]he judicial Power" counsel against reducing the judiciary to an
advisory institution. The principle of coordinacy can thus be a two-edged
sword for executive review: it helps establish the powel; but it also cuts in
favor of a legally-binding role for judicial judgments.
Fourth, the ultimate consequences of a presidential ability to ignore
court judgments seem unthinkable. The President is the constitutional
actor most immediately in control of the military-a fact of which at least
some members of the founding generation were acutely conscious.247
Accordingly, the President must be subject to some form of legal control
while in office. If the President can ignore court judgments that rest on
perceived constitutional errors, there is no evident reason why he cannot

State had no jurisdiction over Indian lands. According to one nineteenth-century historian,
President Andrew Jackson, upon hearing of the Court's decision, declared "Well: John
Marshall has made his decision: now le him enfore itf' 1 Horace Greeley, The American
Conflict- A History of the Great Rebellion in the United States of America, 1860-64 106
(1865). The story is probably apocryphal andJackson's resolve on this issue vras never tested.
See 2 Robert V. Remini, Andrew Jackson and the Course of American Freedom, 1822-1832
276-77 (1981).
244. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text (discussing the "principle of

coordinacy").
245. 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) at 410.
246. 3 Henry P. Johnston, The Correspondence and Public Papers of John Jay 1763-1826
486-89 (1971).
247. George Mason urged that, in the event of impeachment, the President should be
suspended from office. Otherwise, Mason argued, "[w]hen he is arraigned for treason, he has
the command of the army and navy, and may surround the Senate with thirty thousand
troops." 3 Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal
Constitution 494 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1836) (quoted in Labovitz, supra note 191, at 22

n.54).
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also ignore senatorial judgments in impeachment proceedings if he
believes that, for example, he has in fact committed no high crimes or
misdemeanors. It seems unlikely that the Constitution creates a President
who is legally bound by nothing but his conscience.

c. Counterpoint: The Casefor Independent PresidentialReview
Another possible answer to the problem of presidential review is to
maintain that the President has the same power with respect to federal
court judgments as he has with respect to statutes: there is no general
power of suspension or revision, but there is always a power of
independent review for constitutional error. 48 Several persuasive
considerations support this position.
First, judicial judgments have never been regarded as absolutely final
by the courts themselves. Judgments have always (and more so in the
eighteenth century than today) been subject to challenge on a number of
grounds. The policy of finality of judicial decisions has long been at war
with the policies of securing justice and ensuring thatjudicial tribunals do
not exceed the proper scope of their powers. 249 Twentieth-century
jurisprudence has increasingly given weight to the finality aspect of this
balance,20 but even today, judgments are not beyond challenge in
subsequent judicial proceedings.!" The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
permit judgments to be avoided in some circumstances because of, inter
alia, clerical errors, mistake, newly discovered evidence, fraud, and
voidness.! 2 The Restatement (Second) of Judgments specifies as grounds for
avoiding a judgment a lack of subject matter jurisdiction in the tribunal
that issued the judgments, 253 corruption or duress, 25 4 fraud, 25"

248. Constitutional error can take several forms. The court's decision might be grounded
on an incorrect interpretation of the Constitution or the court's remedy might violate the
Constitution.
249. See 1 Restatement (Second) of Judgments §§ 10-12 (1982) (detailing the rules
contesting different types of jurisdiction); Karen N. Moore, Collateral Attack on Subject
Matter Jurisdiction: A Critique of the Restatement (Second) ofJudgments, 66 Cornell L Rev. 534,
534-35 (1981) (discussing the antinomy between the policies of finality, justice, and the abuse
of power); Edward P. Krugman, Note, Filling the Void- Judicial Power and Jurisdictional
Attacks on Judgments, 87Yale hI. 164, 164 (1977) (noting the legal system's need to balance
its goal of resolving disputes quickly and finally with its goal of achieving equality);
Developments in the law: Res Judicata, 65 Harv. L Rev. 818, 820 (1952) (explaining that "the
conclusiveness of prior judgments may free overzealous litigation, perpetuate erroneous
decisions and hamper the flexibility of the courts").
250. See Moore, supra note 249, at 537-43.
251. We focus on challenges to judgments in subsequent proceedings sometimes called
collateral attack on a judgment See 2 Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 64, at 141
(introductory note) (1982). This focus presents most dearly the problem we seek to address:
the extent to which the judgment of one tribunal can bind another legal actor, such as a
subsequent court or the executive official charged with enforcement ofjudgments.
252. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60.
253. Restatement (Second) ofJudgments, supra note 249, §§ 12, 65, 69.
254. Id. §§ 68(1), 70(1)(a).
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changed conditions,24 lack of notice,2 7 and, in rare cases, mistake of
fact or law.2 s At the time of the Constitution's framing, the policy of
finality in judgments was even weaker. Judgments issued by tribunals that
lacked subject matter jurisdiction were generally regarded as void."
Moreover, equity courts would on some occasions prevent enforcement of
judgments at law.2 '0 The nineteenth and twentieth centuries saw
increasing emphasis placed on the importance of finality in judicial
decisions,2 1' but if one is seeking the original meaning of "[tihe judicial
Power" and the conception of finality that it entails, one should at least
start with eighteenth-century practice. The upshot is that finality has always
involved a balancing act, with the eighteenth-century balance tilting
somewhat farther away from the finality of judgments than modem
sensibilities might prefer. Although conceptions of finality within the
judicial department do not necessarily tell us anything about conceptions
of finality across departments,262 the judiciary's traditional treatment of
finality as a policy rather than as a firm legal rule at least suggests that an
absolute rule of finality across departments ought to be accepted only with
considerable hesitation. And if considerations of policy are going to enter
the picture, the policy of assuring fidelity to the Constitution surely counts
as a strong one-perhaps strong enough to warrant a "constitutional error"
exception to the otherwise dominant principle of interdepartmental
finality.
Second, as Professor Michael Stokes Paulsen has strongly emphasized
26
in his recent defense of presidential power to review court judgments,
President Lincoln's assertion of the power to refuse to enforce judgments
in the Menyman case shows that the power has long been understood to
lurk in the background. Hamilton seems also to have anticipated the
power in The Federalistwhen he remarked that the federal judiciary should
not be viewed as threatening because, inter alia, it "must ultimately depend
upon the aid of the executive arm even for the efficacy of its judgments"G---although this statement is admittedly too cryptic to count for

255. Id. §§ 68(2), 70(l)(h).
256. Id. §§ 68(5), 73.
257. Id. § 66.
258. Restatement (Second) ofJudgments, supra note 249, §§ 68(3), 71.
259. See Moore, supra note 249, at 537; Krugman, supra note 249, at 164-71.
260. See Krugman, supra note 249, at 170.
261. See Moore, supra note 249, at 537-43; Krugman, supra note 249, at 171-81.
262. There is no logical requirement that the legislative, executive, and judicial
departments all treat judicial judgments in precisely the same fashion. One can imagine a
regime in which the President, for example, accords either more or less finality to judicial
judgments than does the judiciary itself. "The judicial Power" could, in principle, entail an
absolute requirement of finality as against the political departments but only a limited notion
of finality as against the judiciary itself.
263. See Paulsen, The Mernyman Power, supra note 4, at 88-99; Paulsen, The Most
Dangerous Branch, supra note 4, at 278-83.
264. The Federalist No. 78, at 523 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
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very much. The fact that we have not seen more instances of presidential
review of judgments is not decisive, even if one agrees that the power of
presidential review implies a duty to exercise it. Presidents may simply have
failed to recognize the nondiscretionary nature of their nonenforcement
power-just as they have consistently failed to recognize the
nondiscretionary nature of their obligation to veto legislation they regard
as unconstitutional.
Third, as Professor Paulsen has again emphasized,265 the principle of
coordinacy.can be cast to support an absolute power of presidential review.
The whole point of coordinacy is that no department can dictate to
another how to conduct its constitutionally-assigned affairs. The President
cannot tell the courts how to decide cases, and the courts cannot tell the
President how, when, and whether to execute judgments. If judgments
bind the President, the executive department is subordinate to, rather than
coordinate with, the judicial department. A contrary view of coordinacy,
which sees a rule of absolute obedience to judgments as necessary to avoid
reducing the judicial department to an advisory institution, either
misunderstands the arguments against advisory opinions or carries them
too far. There are two separate strands to the advisory opinion doctrine.
The first strand, reflected in the Correspondence of the Justices, states that
courts can only formally engage in legal interpretation in the context of a
case or controversy properly within their jurisdiction. This principle, even
if sound, has no implications for departmentalism. It deals solely with the
proper occasions for the exercise of the judicial power, not with the
consequences of such exercise. The second strand, reflected in Hayburn's
Case, can indeed be read to require that court judgments be binding on
executive and legislative actors. But the principle ofjudicial independence
reflected in this strand need not, and should not, be taken to imply a
presidential duty of obedience to judgments. As Professor Paulsen has
argued at length, the judicial power can mean the power of independent
judgment-the power to decide without having to give conclusive weight to
the views of Congress or the President-without meaning also the power to
coerce acceptance of those decisions by the other departments. As
Professor Paulsen explains:
The importance of independent judgment should not be
downplayed. The power of independent legal judgment on
matters of constitutional and statutory law, rendered by an elite
body of specialists no longer accountable to party or prejudice, is
a formidable moral and political power in a constitutional
republic-whether or not those judgments are backed by coercive
force. The moral force of persuasive, independent judgment on
matters of constitutional and statutory law by the least dangerous
branch makes it, politically, extremely difficult for the executive
to act in a manner inconsistent with thatjudgment ....
Crucially, executive review does not swallow this judicial
265.

See Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch, supra note 4, at 228-40.
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Co-equal executive
power of independent judgment ....
interpretive authority does not mean supreme executive
interpretive authority because it does not compromise the
judiciary's power of independent judgment within its sphere. The
President may not tell the courts how to decide a case .... The
judiciary gets its say-the power, within its province, to say what
the law is-even though it cannot legally bind the executive with
its opinion. The power to speak is not a cipher.2
Fourth, as Professor Paulsen has argued in perhaps his most
intriguing contribution to this debate,6 7 the ultimate consequences of an
absolute presidential duty to obey court judgments seem unthinkable.
Suppose, for example, that a case is brought challenging an exercise of the
President's veto power, and the Supreme Court affirms a permanent
injunction against any further use of the veto (perhaps with a permanent
injunction against ever seeking reconsideration of the Court's decision). Is
the President truly bound by that judgment? Would Congress be bound by
a judgment issuing a permanent injunction against any further exercises of
the lawmaking power? Ifjudgments are truly and absolutely binding, then
the federal courts, through the issuance of judgments, can take command
of all aspects of the government.2 0 It seems unlikely that the Constitution
creates an unelected Supreme Court which is bound by nothing but its
conscience.
d. Finality and Enforcement: The Middle Ground
We find neither polar position entirely convincing. As Professor
Paulsen persuasively argues, an absolute obligation to obey judgments
seems hard to square with the Constitution's incessant focus on keeping
absolute power out of the hands of any one institution. Moreover, the
affirmative case for judicial supremacy is weak. Historically, the finality of
judgments has been a policy and not a postulate of the judicial system; the
paramount policy of fidelity to the Constitution amply sustains a power of
presidential review for constitutional error. And for the reasons stated in
the counterpoint above, presidential practice in this regard is neither
uniform nor dispositive, the principle of coordinacy seems strongly to
support presidential review, and the potential consequences of judicial
supremacy are at least as unthinkable as the potential consequences of
presidential review. Accordingly, we reject the view that the President is
absolutely bound to enforce court judgments.

266. Id. at 301-02.
267. Id. at 284-87.
268. Congress could not control the Court through impeachments or restrictions on
jurisdiction. The Court could simply declare in a judgment that it has jurisdiction
notwithstanding the content of any congressional statutes and that judgment would be
absolutely binding. The Court could issue a judgment declaring that the Justices are not
subject to impeachment, and such ajudgment would be absolutely binding.
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Neither, however, can we accept Professor Paulsen's legally unlimited
power of presidential review of court judgments. Quite simply, a view that
does not give court judgments some legal effect on the other departments
does not adequately account for the existence of the judicial power.
Professor Paulsen's attempt to define the judicial power as a noncoercive
power of independent judgment does not succeed. According to Professor
Paulsen, a judgment issued by an independent court "is a formidable
moral and political force ... ,,269 The same could be said, however, of
statements made by such a court in explanation of its judgments, of dicta
authored by such a court, of statements made by learned judges in a
nonjudicial forum, and even of statements by respected scholars. On this
analysis, there is nothing distinctive or significant about a judicial
judgment. This is the step in the argument that we cannot accept.
Although there is surprisingly little guidance from the founding era on the
meaning of "[t]hejudicial Power," the context of the Constitution-which,
after all, is a legal document that seeks to allocate governmental
power-suggests that in order to be a bona fide "Power," the judicial power
must have some form of legal, and not merely moral or political, effect. We
cannot solidly prove the point, but we believe that the founding generation
would have viewed the issuance of a judgment as an event qualitatively
different from the expression of dicta or the giving of a speech.
Is there a way of giving legal effect to courtjudgments without falling
headfirst into judicial supremacy? The answer is yes. Court judgments can
have real but less-than-absolute legal effect if they impose on the President
and Congress an obligation of legal (rather than merely epistemological)
deference. With this understanding, the President may legally refuse to
enforce a court judgment, but only if the President concludes, in
accordance with an appropriately demanding standard of proof, that the
judgment was constitutionally erroneous. How dear must it be that a court
judgment is incorrect in order to overcome the legal deference due a
court judgmentid There is no scientific way to answer this question. One
candidate is Thayer's contention that one must find error "so clear that it
is not open to rational question." It is true that Thayer was describing the
deference that unelected courts should give to a democratically
accountable legislature (and presumably to a democratically accountable
president as well) rather than vice versa, but his formulation seems to fit
nicely with what little we know from the founding era concerning the
status of courtjudgments. In any event, it is the best that we can do at this
point; we welcome further refinements about the appropriate standard of
legal deference due to courtjudgments.
Thus, although we do not have supreme confidence in our answer, we
conclude that the best understanding of the role of judgments in the
constitutional scheme is that the President and Congress can refuse to
enforce a judgment only in extreme circumstances: only for constitutional

269.

Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch, supra note 4, at 301.
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error, and only when that error is "so clear that it is not open to rational
question."2 ° Moreover, the principle of constitutional review of
judgments is subject to one fuirther qualification: where private rights are
at stake, the President can engage in executive review of judgments only
when such review results in nonenforcement of a judgment of liability. As
we explain in the following section, the President cannot affirmatively act
to infringe private rights in the face of a judgment of no liability.
e. Due Process and the Liability/NonliabilityDistinmtion
The problem of nonenforcement of judgments is really an issue only
in civil cases. The President can always refuse to enforce a judgment of
conviction in a criminal case by granting a pardon. With respect to
judgments of acquittal in criminal cases, even Professor Paulsen, who has
staunchly defended the President's power to refuse to enforce court
judgments, finds in the Constitution's provisions for jury trial a textual
requirement that judgments of acquittal be respected. 7' One can reach
the same conclusion more straightforwardly by invoking considerations of
due process. The Due Process Clause specifies that "[n]o person shall
be... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law .... ,
One important aspect of due process is the Principle of
legality, which prohibits executive deprivations of life, liberty, or property
that are not supported by positive law embodied in valid statutes and court
judgmentsY5 Accordingly, the President cannot lawfully jail someone
whom a grand jury has refused to indict or whom a petitjury (or judge in
a bench trial) has refused to convict-even if those actors rested their
decisions on erroneous constitutional grounds.
The requirements of due process also establish that, in civil cases,
there is an important difference between refusing to enforce ajudgment of
liability and taking action in the face of a judgment of nonliability. If a
court issues a judgment holding a party not liable-even an erroneous
judgment based on clear constitutional error-it would violate the
principle of legality embodied in the concept of due process for a
President to use the national law enforcement machinery to implement the
President's view of justice. On the other hand, a refusal to enforce a civil
judgment of liability does not constitute a deprivation of life, liberty, or
property. Although the judgment itself is a species of property, a refusal to
enforce the judgment does not deprive its holder of anything-unless one,
in question-begging fashion, regards an unconditional executive obligation
to enforce as part of the judgment. A failure to enforce does not

270. Thayer, supra note 26, at 144. Of course, presidential refusals to enforce court
judgments can be grounds for impeachment.
271. Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch, supra note 4, at 288-92.
272. U.S. Const. amend. V.
273, See,ag., Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.)
272, 276 (1856).
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extinguish the judgment; a subsequent president, or even4 the same
president at a different time, can always choose to enforce it.2
f

Judgments versus Opinions

The President's ordinary obligation to enforce a judgment extends
only to the raw judgment itself: the finding of liability or nonliability and
the specification of the remedy. That duty does not impose on the
President any requirement in future cases to follow the reasoning that led
to the court's judgment or to extend the principles of that judgment
beyond the issues and parties encompassed by it.
Finality in the judicial system is determined by the twin doctrines of
res judicata and collateral estoppel. A brief look at the origins of those
doctrines illustrates the narrow scope in which the finality of the judicial
power operates.
The Roman system of civil law gave birth to the principle of res
"
judicata-literally translated as "a thing or matter settled by judgment."
Defendants in actions before the praetors were allowed to counter the
plaintiff' claims by arguing facts that either defeated the cause of action
or convinced the praetor of the availability of a defense, or exceptions 6
The plea of rei judicataewas one such defense, and Ulpian wrote in Book
15 of his Edict that "a defense of res judicatawill avail whenever the same
issue is raised again between the same persons .... " Only a claim or
issue decided by a judge in the course of a prior adjudication could carry
the force of res judicata, and this adjudication was binding upon the
parties to that original adjudication providing the issues, parties, and
things in dispute were identicalY 8 The claim for relief might be different
but the substance of the cause of action must be the same: "And, generally,
as stated by Julian, the defense of res judicata avails whenever the same

274. A distinction between refusing to enforce a judgment of liability and refusing to
abide by a judgment of nonliability may also be implicit in the concept of departmentalism.
One of the guiding principles of departmentalism is that all relevant governmental actors
must agree on the constitutionality of an action before it takes place. If this principle is a
defining prperly of departmentalism, rather than merely a frequent (though not essential)
consequence of departmentalism, then it can be permissible for a President to refuse to carry
out a levy of execution on a defendant's property when a court has rendered a verdict of
liability but impermissible for the President to initiate a levy of execution in the face of a
judgment of nonliability. Presidential review ofjudgments, on this understanding, can be used
only as a passive rather than as an active force.
275. Black's Law Dictionary 1305 (6th ed. 1990).
276. 2 Henry C. Black, A Treatise on the Law ofJudgments § 501, at 601 (1891).
277. IV The Digest ofJustinian 623 (Theodor Mommsen et al. eds., 1985).
278. Justinian also noted in his Digests that:
When the question is asked whether this defense avails or not, an inquiry must be
made as to whether it is the same property, the same amount, the same right, and
the same ground for claiming and the same parties; unless all these exist together, it
is a different issue.
Id. at 12-14.
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issue is raised again between the same persons, albeit in a different kind of
action."29 The Roman law also recognized the
applicability of res
20
judicata to parties in privity with the original part. 1
The doctrine of collateral estoppel is closely related to the doctrine of
res judicata, but emerged from the Germanic rather than Roman legal
system. ' Res judicata differs from collateral estoppel in that it bars
relitigation of the same cause of action between the same parties; collateral
estoppel bars relitigation of a particular issue or fact. In a second case or
controversy upon a different cause of action, the former adjudication
"operates as an estoppel only as to those matters in issue or points
controverted, upon the determination of which the finding or verdict is
rendered." 2u
In either case, however, the doctrines of finality operate only upon
the parties to and claims in the original action. In particular, nonparties
(or nonprivies) to the original action are not subject to either resjudicata
or collateral estoppel with respect to legal conclusions reached by the
judge in the original action. Instead, the legal conclusions in the original
action affects subsequent actions involving different parties, different
claims, or (where resjudicata does not apply) different issues only through
the doctrine of stare decisis, or precedent.
The judicial doctrine of stare decisis does not legally bind the
President-not even to give Thayerian deference to the judicial reasoning
behind a judgment. Judgments are often accompanied by opinions, which
express the reasons that lie behind the judgment. But the issuance of
opinions is not an essential aspect of the judicial power.8 3 Juries do not
give reasons for their decisions (and their decisions have no precedential
weight), and neither do judges in most instances. The vast majority of legal
rulings at trial are made without a statement of reasons (e.g., "overruled,"
"admitted"). Even on appeal, it is increasingly common for courts to enter
summary dispositions without opinions. Ajudgment is no less a judgment,
and no less final, if it is unaccompanied by a statement of reasons.2 u
It is thus difficult to see how a court can expand the effect of its
judgment by the issuance of an opinion or statement of reasons. Such
statements have the power to influence through their power to persuade,
they may be good indicators of how future cases are likely to be
decided," 5 and they may have some binding force on other courts via the
doctrine of stare decisis, but they do not legally bind nonparties. The

279. Id. at d. 7, 4.
280. See id. at d. 28.
281. Sce Robert W. Millar, The Historical Relation of Estoppel By Record to Res Judicata,
35 U. Ill. L. Rev. 41, 44 (1940) (discussing the emergence of collateral estoppel in America).
282. Cromwell v. County of Sac., 94 U.S. 351, 353 (1876).
283. But see Eisgruber, supra note 4, at 350.
284. Federal statutory requirements that judges give reasons for their conclusions, in the
form of findings of fact and conclusions of law, are therefore constitutionally questionable.
285. See Merrill, supra note 4, at 77-78 (emphasizing this feature ofjudicial opinions).
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like all other potential litigants, will be interested in the
of courts for what they indicate about likely outcomes in future
the President is not bound to "enforce" those statements.
The
286
to enforce ends with the four corners of the judgment.

III. PRESIDENTIAL REvIEw INPERSPECTIVE
Departmentalism is often thought to lead to chaos and conflict: if
every department interprets the Constitution for itself, it is hard to plan
one's conduct, and the various departments will constantly be at each
others' throats. This Article no doubt adds fuel to the fire for some
readers, as it raises the specter of an unending series of impeachment
crises as Congress tries to assert its will over the other departments. Surely,
one might think, this cannot be the scheme bequeathed to us by the
practical members of the founding generation.
Many of these criticisms of departmentalism, however, can also be
raised against a system of separation of powers. Dividing power across,
jurisdictions and among institutions is a recipe for uncertainty and conflict.
One cannot be sure that a bill that passes one house will pass another, that
a bill that passes Congress will be signed by the President, that legislation
once enacted will be enforced in a particular or predictable way, or that
enacted and enforced legislation will be interpreted and applied by the
courts in a particular or predictable way. Moreover, the division of powers
is consciously designed to place the government in an ongoing state of
tension, with each institution in a constant struggle with the others for
power and prestige; such is the dear message of Madison's brilliant essay
2
on governmental structure in The Federalist.
" All of this chaos and
conflict was deliberately left to us by the founders because they deemed it
necessary to preserve liberty.
Departmentalism is simply one aspect of the separation of powers.
The power to interpret and apply the Constitution is a great and awesome
power-just as is the power to govern through legislation. The same
considerations that made the founding generation leery, and that ought to
make the present generation leery, of placing all legislative powers in the
hands of one institution also counsel in favor of dividing the power of
interpretation among many different actors, with no one holding absolute

286. It is not always easy to identify the "four comers" of the judgment. It is often difficult
to determine exactly which matters were definitively concluded by the judgment and hence
are subject to its final disposition. The Restatement notes that a valid and final judgment that
extinguishes a plaintiff's claim bars further claims "with respect to all or any part of the
transaction, or series of connected transactions, out of which the action arose," but noting
that "[wlhat factual grouping constitutes a 'transaction,' and what groupings constitute a
'series,' are to be determined pragmatically," based on such matters as "whether the facts are
related in time, space, origin, or motivation, whether they form a convenient trial unit, and
whether their treatment as a unit conforms to the parties' expectations or business
understanding or usage." 1 Restatement (Second) ofJudgments § 24 (1982).
287. See The Federalist No. 51 (James Madison) (J. Cooke ed., 1961).
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sway over the others.!8 If the result is some chaos and conflict, that,
along with eternal vigilance, is the price of liberty.
The framers may have been wrong (although we do not think so)
about the virtues of a system of separated and divided powers. But it is the
system that they created. When viewed through the lens of this system, a
power of independent presidential review does not seem so strange or
threatening.

288. See Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch, supra note 4, at 929-30 (arguing that the
framers intended each branch to share in the role of interpreter of the Constitution).

